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TESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF FAMILY PRIVACY:
THE SPECIAL CASE OF PEDIATRIC SIBLING
TRANSPLANTS
Doriane Lambelet Coleman †

A six-year-old girl suffers third-degree burns over eighty
percent of her body. Her chance of survival with minimal scarring
is said to depend on her identical twin sister’s availability as an
organ source. 1 There are other transplant options—including the
parents—but because the twins’ skin is “equivalent,” a “sibling
transplant” is likely to result in a better medical and aesthetic
outcome for the burned twin. 2 Her doctor thus proposes to harvest
her healthy sister’s skin on “her backside from her bra line down
to the bottom of her buttocks or possibly her thighs.” This
procedure would be repeated up to three times in as many weeks.
It would cause “‘permanent discoloration,’” and would feel like
“‘a severe sunburn with blisters’” for “3–5 days with return to
normality with[in] 10–12 days.” 3
† Professor of Law, Duke Law School. B.A., Cornell University, 1982. J.D., Georgetown
University Law Center, 1988. This paper is dedicated to Katharine (Kate) Bartlett, Elizabeth
(Buffie) Scott, and Barbara Bennett Woodhouse. Every generation of scholars stands on the
shoulders of its predecessors and I have always known how lucky I have been to stand on theirs
in particular. Perhaps more than anything else I have written, this paper reflects their combined
influence: as I read them together, hopefully intelligently, they are largely responsible for the
progressive concept of the child that I describe here. I am eternally grateful for their work and
support. I am also very grateful to the people, research assistants, colleagues, and friends, who
took the time to help me otherwise along the way: Dr. Philip M. Rosoff, Kathryn W. Bradley,
Curtis A. Bradley, Thomas Main, Jim Coleman, Len Simon, Christopher Giroard, and Kenton
Atta-Krah.
1 Samuel J. Tilden, Ethical and Legal Aspects of Using an Identical Twin as a Skin
Transplant Donor for a Severely Burned Minor, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 87 (2005).
2 Verified Petition for Declaratory Judgment, In re S.C., No. 180564, at 3 (Ala. Prob. Ct.
Jan. 2, 2003) [hereinafter Verified Petition] (on file with author). Although the girls’ full names
have been published elsewhere, throughout this Article I have used only their initials.
3 Guardian ad Litem Report to the Court, In re S.C., Nos. 180564 & 180565, at 2 (Ala. Prob.
Ct. Jan. 6, 2003) [hereinafter Guardian ad Litem Report] (on file with author). This report was
filed by S.C.’s guardian ad litem (GAL) who opposed her use as a skin source. The Verified
Petition described the surgery similarly:

Harvesting the necessary skin from [S.C.] would entail removing a thin layer of skin
from [S.C.]’s scalp, the backs of her legs in the thigh area, and possibly from her
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Concerned about the legal implications of harvesting skin from
a healthy minor child, the hospital consults with outside advisors,
including at the local juvenile court, who suggest that the
procedure might constitute child abuse. Anxious to proceed, the
parents thus choose to bypass that forum and file an action in
probate to establish their right to use their healthy daughter’s skin
to benefit her injured sister. 4 There, they argue that the grafts are
in the healthy child’s best interests, presumably because of the
sisters’ close relationship. 5 Her guardian ad litem argues
otherwise: “[U]nder no circumstances will this ‘wellchild’ . . . escape these surgeries without immediate physical pain
and trauma in addition to life-long physical skin damage
appearance issues that create probable severe psychological and
emotional damage.” 6 The court, which goes to extraordinary
lengths to establish its equitable jurisdiction, 7 finds that, on
balance, given the risks and benefits to both sisters, the parents
have the right to authorize the surgeries. 8
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back. In order to complete the process several harvestings may be necessary and
would be spaced approximately seven to ten days apart.
Verified Petition, supra note 2, at 3.
4 Tilden, supra note 1, at 97.
5 Verified Petition, supra note 2, at 5.
6 Guardian ad Litem Report, supra note 3, at 4.
7 See Order on Petition for Declaratory Judgment, In re S.C., Nos. 180564 & 180565, at 2
(Ala. Prob. Ct. Jan. 6, 2003) [hereinafter Order on Petition] (on file with author); see also infra
notes 140–59 and accompanying text (discussing this analysis).
8 Order on Petition, supra note 7, at 3.
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INTRODUCTION
Parents hurt their children all the time. They hurt their children’s
bodies, their feelings, their development, and their chances for
happiness and success as adults, for reasons that include maliciousness,
indifference, momentary or longer-term lapses of attention, competing
priorities, a desire for their progeny’s success, religion, culture,
psychological dysfunction, and outright incapacity. Indeed, childhood is
marked in part by parentally-inflicted injuries, although some of us are
luckier than others with respect to the degree to which we suffer or
cause harm.
Precisely for this reason, but also because of ideology, the
government mostly does not get involved. As a practical matter, even if
there were some way for the government to know each time a child is
hurt by her parents, there simply are not enough public resources
allocated to taking care of children for it to intervene and then to have a
net positive effect in every case. 9 Even if money were no object,
however, this extent of state incursion into the family would be
anathema in a political system and society that is premised on limited
government, that privileges individual privacy in both its decisional and
physical forms, and that not only protects but also celebrates its
ideological, cultural, and religious diversity. 10 Family privacy 11 and the

9 See Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Storming the Castle to Save the Children: The Ironic
Costs of a Child Welfare Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 413
(2005); Michael Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of “Neglected” Children: A Search for
Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 987 (1975).
10 Martha Albertson Fineman, What Place for Family Privacy?, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1207, 1212 n.31, 1223 (1999).
11 Family privacy can mean different things. See, e.g., id. at 1207 (family privacy means the
right to freedom from state interference that belongs to the family as a unit or entity, rather
than to its included individuals); Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89
YALE L.J. 624, 634 (1980) (family privacy means freedom from state intervention in “intimate
associations” among individuals); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Dark Side of Family
Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1247, 1254 (1999) (family privacy is essentially the same thing
as parental autonomy since, “[w]hen we adopt a theoretical framework that endows any ‘unit’
of persons with ‘autonomy,’ or a ‘right’ to be free of state intervention, in practice, we are
conferring unregulated authority on the dominant member within this closed community of
persons.”). In this Article I mean for family privacy to signify the sphere of family life and
parental decisions about family life that are free from state interference.
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substantially overlapping doctrine of parental autonomy 12 are the
constitutional embodiments of this idea. 13
Of course, like other rights in this liberal democratic scheme,
family privacy and parental autonomy are limited by the principle of
ordered liberty, which “provides for freedom within assumed societal
goals and values as opposed to freedom from assumed goals and
values.” 14 Based on this principle, the government will intervene in the
family when parents harm their children in ways that transgress
prevailing social norms and aspirations as these are expressed in the
law. 15 To use a cartographic metaphor that is prevalent in this context,
prevailing social norms and aspirations are the tools that are used to set
the outer boundaries of family privacy and thus also of parental
authority to cause children harm. 16 And particular harms are permitted
or prohibited according to where they fall on the map thus drawn. 17
12 See Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Legal Ethics of Pediatric Research, 57 DUKE L.J. 517,
545–49 (2007); Woodhouse, supra note 11, at 1254.
13 Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67 TUL. L. REV. 955, 959
(1993) (“[T]he family acts as an important institutional check on the power of the state to mold
citizens in its own image.”); id. at 996 (“[P]arental authority . . . is necessary for the
development of responsible individuals who have been raised with a sense of belonging to
distinct and diverse moral traditions.”); Fineman, supra note 10, at 1214 (concluding that
“[t]his ideology of state non-intervention is rooted in idealization, but also references the
perceived pragmatics of family relationships and the acknowledged limitations of legal,
particularly judicial, systems as substitutes for family decision-making.”).
14 Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Seattle Compromise: Multicultural Sensitivity and
Americanization, 47 DUKE L.J. 717, 718 (1998).
15 Id. at 719; see also Dailey, supra note 13, at 959, 992 (noting that “the family’s role in
initiating children into political life suggests that there must be some constitutional limits to the
degree of family diversity a liberal democracy may tolerate” and that “[t]he settled boundaries
of parental authority inject a strong normative vision of the ‘good citizen’ into family life”);
Fineman, supra note 10, at 1224 (noting that “[e]ntity privacy . . . denote[s] a line of nonintervention drawn around on-going functioning relationships”); Lee E. Teitelbaum, The
Family as a System: A Preliminary Sketch, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 537, 548, 556 (noting that “[t]he
institutional idea [of the family] has normative content precisely because it grounds
expectations about conduct,” and that “[a]t the most general level, family relations exist in a
setting that includes legal and social norms that strongly influence the institutional idea of the
family, the way families define the arrangements available to them, and the ways family
members live their lives together”).
16 See, e.g., Dailey, supra note 13, at 965 (noting the historical construction of the family as
“‘a little commonwealth’”); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L.
REV. 2401, 2453 (1995) (noting that “[e]xplicit legal commands [regulating the parent-child
relationship] are limited largely to a series of preemptive rules that define the boundaries of
parental discretion”); Teitelbaum, supra note 15, at 542 (recalling colonial history which
described the family as “distinct from that other entity, the state, [which] must be given some
decisional space” and describing a married couple as “form[ing] a precinct that stands apart
from and is ordinarily closed to state authority”); id. at 546 (rejecting the conventional idea of
“the family . . . as an island or refuge”); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”:
Meyer and Pierce and the Child As Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1051 (1992)
(describing state incursions on family privacy and parental autonomy using language such as
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Because prevailing social norms and aspirations are used to define
the boundaries of family privacy and parental authority, as social norms
and aspirations change, so do these boundaries. Thus, when society
conceives of the child as being one with her parent, 18 or in an implicit
contractual relationship with her parent in which “the infant ‘agrees’ to
obey the parent in exchange for the parent’s forbearance from allowing
the helpless infant to perish,” 19 or—like slaves or even a treasured
object—as the property of her parents, 20 or as the property of god whose
fiduciary is her parent, 21 the parent has quite a lot of freedom to hurt her
child. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse has summarized some of the
implications of the boundaries established according to these propertyrelated norms:
Under Roman law, fathers possessed the power of life or death over
their children. Even in the American Colonies, laws in many places
provided capital punishment for a child who struck or cursed his
parent, although there is no record of such sentences being carried
out. Well into the nineteenth century, a father could enroll his male
children in the army and collect the enrollment bounty, betroth his

“patriarchal governance was being challenged in skirmishes on many fronts”; “patriarchy
fought to maintain its ground”; “the boundaries of its kingdom were blurring”; “[p]rogressive
reforms . . . pushed at the borders of the domestic realm”).
17 Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Role of the Law in Relationships Within Immigrant
Families: Traditional Parenting Practices in Conflict with American Concepts of Maltreatment,
in IMMIGRANT FAMILIES IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 287, 290 (Jennifer E. Lansford et al. eds.,
2007) (explaining that governments develop “their definitions of [maltreatment] in the same
way that they develop other values-based legislation . . . [, i.e., using a combination of]
prevailing (majoritarian) norms and sometimes also the recommendations of experts in the
field about what is needed to achieve public policy goals”); id. (explaining that the Supreme
Court has for the most part accepted the states’ maltreatment rules as also setting the outer
boundaries of parental authority to cause children harm); see also Coleman, supra note 12, at
545–99 (further elaborating on the relationship between state maltreatment rules and the
constitutional doctrine of parental autonomy).
18 See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, From Property to Personhood: A Child-Centered
Perspective on Parents’ Rights, 5 GEORGETOWN J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 313, 313 (1998)
(describing this identity relationship as a source of the view of the child as property, i.e., “[f]lesh
of their father’s flesh, children rightly belonged to the patriarch, to be worked, traded, and
given in marriage in exchange for money”); id. (describing Aristotle as another source of this
same view, i.e., “[t]here cannot be injustice towards that which is one’s own; and a chattel, or a
child, until it is of a certain age and has attained independence, is as it were a part of oneself;
and nobody chooses to injure himself (hence there can be no injustice towards oneself) and so
neither can there be any conduct towards them that is politically just or unjust”).
19 Id. at 314 (describing Thomas Hobbes’s view of parental authority).
20 See id. at 313 (describing the property theory of parental authority over children as an
aspect of “[t]he concept of human property, of which slavery was the most notorious vestige,”
and as imagining “parental rights as being virtually absolute and an end in themselves, rather
than as an outgrowth of parents’ responsibilities and a means to secure the well-being of their
children”).
21 See id. at 314 (describing John Locke’s view that “God was the true owner of children.
God created children and gave them into their parents’ care: thus parental powers were a form
of trusteeship of the Creator’s property”).
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minor female children to persons of his choice, put his children to
work as day laborers on farms or factories and collect their wage
packets. As recently as in 1920 a parent who killed a child in the
course of punishment could claim a legal excuse for homicide in no
fewer than nine states. A father had the power to decide where and
with whom his child would reside, and to transfer his children by
testamentary disposition to someone other than their mother. 22

However, when society rejects these property-related norms and reconceives the child as a “collective resource,”23 or as an individual
worthy of respect in her own right who belongs ultimately to herself and
whose parent is her fiduciary during the period of her infancy, 24 the
parent has quite a lot less freedom to hurt her child. In such a society,
the parent is presumed to be her child’s fiduciary—her primary or “‘first
best’ caretaker[]” 25—because she is naturally inclined to protect her
child’s survival and success and otherwise to act in her best interests. 26
Within this scheme, the state in its twin parens patriae and police power
roles is viewed mostly as a “junior partner,” assisting the parent to raise
her child up to be a healthy and responsible member of society, but also
as a last check on the parent who might violate her fiduciary obligations
by causing harm to the child that transgresses the boundaries of family
privacy. 27
This last, most progressive, concept of the child and her
relationship to her parent and the state is still largely aspirational.
Nevertheless, it is expressed in modern law and also to a great degree in
22 Id.; see also Emily Buss, What the Law Should (and Should Not) Learn from Child
Development Research, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 13 (2009).
23 Woodhouse, supra note 16, at 1051–52, 1054 (introducing the idea of the child as a
“collective resource” whose “highest duty was no longer obedience to parents, but preparation
for citizenship” and who was “not [the] private property of his parent, nor of himself,
but . . . belonging to the community, the collective family”; and positing that this shift away
from the view of the child as the property of her parents was in part responsible for the
development beginning in the late nineteenth century of child welfare, child labor, and
mandatory school attendance laws).
24 See Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 294 (1988)
(arguing that the law should express a view of parenthood “based upon notions of benevolence
and responsibility” rather than “in notions of exchange and individual rights”); Gregory A.
Loken, Gratitude and the Map of Moral Duties Toward Children, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1121, 1149
(1999) (citing Immanuel Kant on the child, her relationship with her parents, and their
obligations to her); Scott & Scott, supra note 16, passim (demonstrating how the law’s
structuring of the parent-child relationship is consistent with a fiduciary model); Woodhouse,
supra note 16, passim (beginning her development of a “trusteeship” model of the parent-child
relationship); see also PAUL RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON: EXPLORATIONS IN MEDICAL
ETHICS 14, 24–26 (2d ed. 2002) (describing a fiduciary theory of the parent-child relationship in
the medical and research settings).
25 SAMUEL M. DAVIS ET AL., CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 1 (4th ed. 2009) (using this
expression).
26 See Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
27 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 163–68 (1944); Coleman, supra note 12, at
548–49, 616 (describing this relationship).
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the informal social norms that complement its terms. Thus, in contrast
with earlier periods, a parent’s legal and cultural obligations today
include not only assuring her child the basic necessities of life—food,
shelter, and medical care—but also (among other things) a childhood
free of labor and maltreatment, an education, and in cases of intrafamily conflict, focused attention on her physical, educational,
emotional, and developmental best interests. 28
The goal of this Article is to situate the parenting practice described
in the introductory illustration—the use of minor children as an organ
source 29 for their ill siblings, or “pediatric sibling transplants”—within
this historical and theoretical context, with an emphasis on
understanding how it is or can be justified in the current period. In the
process, I hope to develop a more complete picture of the modern
boundaries of family privacy. Sibling transplants are particularly, maybe
even uniquely, illuminating of these boundaries because unlike most all
other parenting practices they appear to have broad (albeit mostly tacit)
societal support at the same time that the surgeries involved violate the
strongest and least controversial of the norms at the core of the modern
concept of the child and her relationship with her parents: The
requirement that parents protect their children from unnecessary
serious physical harm. 30 In at least many instances, they also appear to
violate parents’ obligation to do right by their children’s emotional and
developmental wellbeing; although this latter obligation does not have
the same normative or doctrinal weight as its physical counterpart, it is
still a significant aspect of the progressive concept of the child and her
relationships with her parents and the state. As a result, the use of
healthy minor children as organ sources for their ill siblings is a puzzle
that both tests the boundaries of parental authority and provides the
basis for the development of important details about their contours.
Specifically, the practice of using healthy minor children as organ
sources presents as one of three possibilities: First, it presents most
See Coleman, supra note 12, at 614–19.
Throughout this Article I refer to healthy children from whom organs are harvested as
organ “sources” rather than as “donors.” Although the latter term is more common, I use the
former because I agree with the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American
Medical Association that “donation” is not only a misnomer but also disingenuous in this
context since “minors generally cannot give valid consent to donation,” and since (because of
their age or the circumstances) they may not even be asked for or capable of giving their assent.
COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS’N, THE USE OF MINORS AS ORGAN
AND TISSUE DONORS: REPORT 3–I-93, at 1 (1993).
30 This practice is one of a number of medically unnecessary surgeries that include cosmetic
and gender re-assignment surgeries, and male circumcision. All are alike in that they are
generally (if only tacitly) accepted at the same time that they violate the prohibition against
physical abuse of a child. See Coleman, supra note 12, at 553–59 (describing de facto exceptions
to child maltreatment law). The use of healthy children as organ donors for their ill siblings is
most probative of the boundaries of family privacy, however, the case is more difficult to make
here than it is in these other contexts that the surgery is in the donor child’s best interests.
28
29
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easily but also most unsatisfactorily as an important relic of the
historical concepts of the child as property and of parents as sovereigns
of the kingdom that is the family. Second, it may reflect a particularly
strong set of traditional and still-vital countervailing norms, in this case
about family unity or interdependence, that manage in certain special
circumstances to trump our commitment to a progressive sense of the
child. Third, to the extent that a real commitment to the child as an
individual requires recognition of the fact that her first nuclear family—
including in its composition and culture—is a necessary if not inevitable
part of what constitutes her as a person, the practice may be seen as
perfectly consonant with a most progressive sense of the child.
Developing the latter two possibilities in particular allows for the
establishment of grounded views not only about the practice itself but
also, and most importantly, about the boundaries that they either
transgress or amplify.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I describes the relatively
sparse legal history of pediatric sibling transplants beginning with the
first cases decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court sitting
in equity in 1957 through the extraordinary 2003 In re S.E. decision,
featured in the introductory illustration. In contrast with previous
summary renditions of this history, 31 it provides a thorough analysis of
the cases that makes clear that—contrary to the generally-held view—
they can no longer be considered the basis for parental or judicial
authority to use healthy children as organ sources for their ill or injured
siblings. Specifically, it situates the cases in a period of procedural flux in
American law during which the state courts’ equity jurisdiction became
increasingly narrow and thus decreasingly available to parents seeking
authorization to proceed with pediatric sibling transplants. The
procedural gymnastics engaged by the parties and legal actors in In re
S.C. exemplify these difficulties in the modern era. They also exemplify
the conundrum that the pediatric sibling transplant cases pose for the
law: What is it about the practice of using healthy minor children as
organ sources that causes it to remain not only sub rosa but also
probably ultra vires, even as all of the relevant parties including lawyers
and judges seem willing to pursue the option in particular
circumstances?

31 This line of cases has been described previously; however, because the commentators
apparently did not have access to the original case files, or because they did not appreciate the
significance of the cases’ foundations in the courts’ historic but now largely diminished equity
jurisdiction, they are incomplete or incorrect in important respects. See Robert J. Pristave &
Katie L. Watson, Kidney Donation by Children and the Mentally Handicapped: Evolution of
Precedent, in LEGAL AND ETHICAL CONCERNS IN TREATING KIDNEY FAILURE 7, 8–11 (Eli A.
Friedman ed., 2000); Jennifer K. Robbennolt et al., Advancing the Rights of Children and
Adolescents to Be Altruistic: Bone Marrow Donation by Minors, 9 J.L. & HEALTH 213 (1994).
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Part II attempts to answer this question. It first elaborates on the
principles that underlie modern law’s inevitable rejection of the practice,
focusing on fiduciary theory and its doctrinal application in the states’
battery, consent, and maltreatment laws. It then develops the arguments
from family unit and interdependence and obligation theories in
support of the right of parents to use their healthy minor children as
organ sources for needy family members. It closes with an analysis of
the practical and normative implications of the awkward status quo for
children who would be used as organ sources, and for the law’s capacity
to draw the boundaries of family privacy.
Part III argues that the boundaries of family privacy should and
will continue to be drawn according to fiduciary theory and its
associated norms and aspirations; competing norms and aspirations
about the child as property and the family as a unit are practically and
ethically weak by comparison and also unlikely to gain sufficient
currency in the modern context. It joins scholars who respect fiduciary
theory’s privileging of the child’s physical integrity but who also have
urged a commitment to the child’s emotional and developmental
interests: Doing so is controversial for many of the same reasons that
explain the law’s reluctance generally to recognize emotional harms, and
yet it is necessary to assure that the fiduciary enterprise is meaningful.
Finally, it applies these principles to the special case of pediatric sibling
transplants, arguing that the law must take an express stand on the
practice to assure that the healthy child who would be used as an organ
source is adequately protected—nonbinding medical protocols are
insufficient for this purpose—and that the protections developed should
bar transplants unless they are shown by clear and convincing evidence
to be in the healthy child’s multiple interests.
The Article concludes that resolving the issues raised by pediatric
sibling transplants according to fiduciary theory will serve to clarify the
boundaries of family privacy, and also to assure that they remain set to
protect children against parentally-inflicted harm that cannot be
justified according to their interests. Although parents will always have
competing interests to consider, including their own and those of their
other children, the state ought to be permitted to intervene in the family
and its decisionmaking to protect the child who would be seriously
injured as a result.
I. A LEGAL HISTORY OF PEDIATRIC SIBLING TRANSPLANTS
Neither the medical practice of using living minor children as an
organ source for their ill siblings nor the legal practice of allowing or
disallowing the surgeries is well documented, at least not publicly. For
example, online histories of transplantation abound, including those
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involving living donors, but these histories typically omit or obscure
references to living pediatric donors; 32 courts that have been asked to
authorize parents to consent to the transplants typically have not
written or published their opinions and have impounded or sealed the
accompanying records; 33 and although the federal government
publishes detailed annual data on living donations, it appears likely that
underreporting of pediatric donations is the norm. 34 Nevertheless,
despite its sub rosa nature, it is possible to understand something of the
history and scope of the practice from a combination of the clinical
possibilities, related writing in the medical and legal literature, and
available (albeit mostly unpublished) case law. From these sources, we
can assume that, with the exception of surgeries whose short and/or
long term negative physical consequences for the prospective donor
cannot be ignored, the use of living minor children as organ sources has
probably tracked the use of living adult donors. 35
32 See, e.g., Donation & Transplantation History, UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING
(UNOS), http://www.unos.org/donation/index.php?%20topic=history (last visited Mar. 14,
2014) (noting that the “[f]irst successful living donor liver transplant [was] performed” in 1989,
but that it was not until 1998 that the “[f]irst successful adult-to-adult living donor liver
transplant [was] performed,” and otherwise omitting references to pediatric transplantation). A
clear exception is the proliferation, particularly in the last several years, of details and
commentary about children donating bone marrow and stem cells. See, e.g., Comm. on
Bioethics, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, 125
PEDIATRICS 392 (2010) [hereinafter AAP Policy Statement]; Rebecca D. Pentz et al., The Ethical
Justification for Minor Sibling Bone Marrow Donation: A Case Study, 13 ONCOLOGIST 148
(2008); Michael A. Pulsipher, A Donor’s a Person, No Matter How Small, 119 BLOOD 2705
(2012); Lainie Friedman Ross, In Defense of the American Academy of Pediatrics Policy
Statement-Children as Hematopoietic Stem Cell Donors, 56 PEDIATRIC BLOOD & CANCER 520
(2011); Jan Styczynski et al., Risk of Complications During Hematopoietic Stem Cell Collection in
Pediatric Sibling Donors: A Prospective European Group for Blood and Marrow Transplantation
Pediatric Diseases Working Party Study, 119 BLOOD 2935 (2012); see also infra notes 79–80,
124–125 (discussing this further).
33 See, e.g., Pristave & Watson, supra note 31, at 10–11; John A. Robertson, Organ
Donations by Incompetents and the Substituted Judgment Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 48, 53
n.26 (1976).
34 Compare Organ Procurement & Transplantation Network, Living Donors Recovered in
the U.S. by Donor Age, U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES,
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/latestData/step2.asp (Step 1: “Choose Category” select “Donor”
and “Choose Organ” select “All”; Step 2: follow “Living Donors by Donor Age” hyperlink)
(including detailed numbers for all organ transplants from 1988 to 2012) (last visited Mar. 19,
2014), with infra notes 124–25 and accompanying text (discussing prevalence of pediatric
sibling transplants in the current period). Cf. Mary E. Olbrisch et al., Children as Living Organ
Donors: Current Views and Practice in the United States, 15 CURRENT OPINION ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION 241, 242 & tbl.1 (2010) (providing some data but noting that it may not be
complete); Lainie Friedman Ross & J. Richard Thistlethwaite, Jr., Minors as Living Solid-Organ
Donors, 122 PEDIATRICS 454, 456 (2008) [hereinafter AAP Clinical Report] (same).
35 I do not mean to suggest that the numbers of healthy children used as organ sources
track the numbers of adult donors; because of the administrative and procedural hurdles in the
way of the former, if not also because of a continuing squeamishness about the practice, it is
likely that the numbers are not at all the same. See, e.g., AAP Clinical Report, supra note 34, at
454–55 (suggesting that “[a]lthough rare, children do serve as [solid-organ] donors” and
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Although it is likely that skin grafts were taken from healthy minor
children to benefit their injured siblings earlier in the twentieth
century, 36 the first documented uses of minor children as organ donors
appear to have involved kidney and bone marrow transplants between
identical twins starting in the late 1950s. 37 Professor William Curran of
Boston University was the first to describe the origins of the kidney
cases in the legal literature, in an article published in 1959:
The first successful homotransplantation of a kidney in
identical twins was performed at the Peter Bent Brigham Hospital in
Boston in 1954. 38 In this case the twins were adults.
In 1956 the same hospital was confronted with [three] requests for
similar procedures on identical twins who were minors. In each of
the cases, one of the twins was suffering from chronic renal disease
which would soon prove fatal if a kidney was not transferred from
the healthy twin. For the hospital staff and its board of trustees the
request raised, among many problems, a puzzling legal question. For
every medical and surgical procedure performed in a hospital a
consent is obtained to avoid the act being found a battery (and an
assault, if the patient is conscious at the time). For minors, all
hospitals obtain the consent of the parents or guardians. The
question here was whether the consent, in fact, the request, of the
parents was sufficient to warrant the hospital in proceeding. In most
cases of minors, of course, parental consent is controlling in regard
to medical treatment. However, in such cases the treatment is always
potentially beneficial to the child. In homotransplantation of a kidney
from a healthy twin to save the life of the sibling, there is a potential
providing as examples that “at least 60 children younger than 18 years served as living kidney
donors between 1987 and 2000, during which time approximately 40[,]000 live kidney
donations occurred” and that “[a]t least 4 minors in the United States have served as living liver
donors since 1989”); Olbrisch et al., supra note 34, at 242 (suggesting that the numbers of
healthy children used as organ sources is actually on the decline as a result of increased
attention to children’s “rights and protections” and “policies that advantage [children] in the
allocation of organs from deceased donors”).
36 Homologous skin transplantation using adult donors was a reality before the kidney
cases. See Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (suggesting that a parent probably
could consent to the use of her child as a skin donor for a needy cousin); Organ
Transplantation,
WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organ_transplantation
(last
modified Mar. 9, 2014) (summarizing the history of organ transplantation).
37 History
of Transplantation, FRED HUTCHINSON CANCER RES. CENTER,
http://www.fhcrc.org/en/treatment/long-term-follow-up/FAQs/transplantation.html
(last
visited Mar. 14, 2014).
38 For a discussion of this pioneering surgery see M.J. Friedrich, Joseph Murray, MD—
Transplantation Pioneer, 292 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2957 (2004), available at
http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=200049 (noting that Dr. Murray received
the Nobel Prize for Physiology or Medicine in 1990 for his development of the living kidney
transplant procedure).
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benefit for the sick twin, but what of the healthy donor? He will lose
one of his two kidneys. At some time in the future such a loss could
be highly detrimental should his remaining kidney be threatened.
There being no law on the subject in Massachusetts or elsewhere the
hospital trustees and the surgical staff were advised to seek a
declaratory judgment. 39

Because the resulting three decisions—Masden v. Harrison, 40 Huskey v.
Harrison, 41 and Foster v. Harrison 42—were never published and were
apparently under seal, Professor Curran’s account has long been the
basis for further discussion of their particulars by courts and legal
commentators. 43 I describe this trilogy in additional detail below based
on files I was able to obtain from the state’s archives.
The decisions were rendered by the state’s Supreme Judicial
Court 44 sitting in equity in a single justice session. 45 Consistent with the
legal advice given to the Brigham Hospital and its surgical team, at the
time, the courts’ equity jurisdiction was invoked when an injunctive
remedy was sought or when there was an absence of law on the subject
of the suit. 46 Both of these doors to equity were open to the petitioners.
39 William J. Curran, A Problem of Consent: Kidney Transplantation in Minors, 34 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 891, 892 (1959) (footnote omitted); see also Pristave & Watson, supra note 31, at 9
(“Declaratory judgment is a procedural mechanism that allows parties . . . to go to court and
receive a ruling on whether what they propose to do is legal.”).
40 No. 68651 (Mass. Eq. June 12, 1957) (decision on file with author).
41 No. 68666 (Mass. Eq. Aug. 30, 1957) (decision on file with author).
42 No. 68674 (Mass. Eq. Nov. 20, 1957) (decision on file with author).
43 See, e.g., Pristave & Watson, supra note 31, at 9 n.3 (indicating that their account is based
on the Curran article); Robertson, supra note 33, at 78 n.26 (same).
44 Massachusetts calls its supreme or highest court the Supreme Judicial Court. See Neal
Quenzer & Francis X. Spina, Supreme Judicial Court, in 1 MASS. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC.,
APPELLATE PRACTICE IN MASSACHUSETTS ch. 1 (3d ed. 2011) (summarizing the history and
institutional role of this court). At least two previous authors commenting on the trilogy have
misunderstood this point, suggesting erroneously that the cases were decided by lower level
trial courts. See Pristave & Watson, supra note 31, at 9–10. Pristave and Watson critique the
decisions for failing to set a clear standard that could provide guidance to parties and courts in
the future. Id. at 10. It is likely they did not understand or notice the fact that the decisions were
rendered by the court exercising its equity jurisdiction, which was (at least relative to law)
intentionally standardless. See infra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing the use of
equity in this context and the history of equity jurisdiction generally).
45 Single justice sessions are used mostly in cases in which time is of the essence. See, e.g.,
Karen Hennessey et al., Interlocutory Relief in Child Welfare Cases, in 1 MASS. CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUC., CHILD WELFARE PRACTICE IN MASSACHUSETTS ch. 12, § 12.2.1 (1st ed. Supp.
2012) (noting the use of such sessions in child custody cases); see also Quenzer & Spina, supra
note 44 (describing the court’s single justice session in general).
46 Historically, equity was “[a] system of jurisprudence collateral to, and in some respects
independent of, ‘law’; the object of which [wa]s to render the administration of justice more
complete, by affording relief where the courts of law [we]re incompetent to give it.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 540 (6th ed. 1990); see also JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE:
CASES AND MATERIALS 22–23 (10th ed. 2009) (setting out the history of the equity courts);
Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429,
passim (2003) (providing a particularly detailed account of the historical division between law

COLEMAN.35.4 (Do Not Delete)

2014]

4/10/2014 2:22 PM

TESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF FAMILY

1301

That is, they all sought a declaration of the parties’ legal rights, and none
of the three areas of the law implicated by the facts had directly
applicable rules. 47 Thus, the tort of battery and its consent defense as
these apply to minors had not developed doctrine specifically on the
issue of nontherapeutic procedures. 48 The state’s child maltreatment law

and equity and their procedural merger). Law was considered “incompetent” or “inadequate”
in this context because it did not speak to the issue at hand, because the kind of relief or remedy
sought, for example a declaratory judgment, an injunction, or specific performance, could not
be awarded by a law court which could only award monetary damages, or because law’s thencumbersome procedures made relief inaccessible to the petitioner. KEVIN M. CLERMONT,
PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 24–25 (2d ed. 2009). Thus, the equity courts assumed
jurisdiction of cases—opened their doors to the petitioner—when one or more of these factors
was at issue. When equity jurisdiction attached in this earlier period, the judge’s discretion was
guided by (i.e., the standard for making the decision was) “fairness as contrasted with the
strictly formulated rules of common law.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra. Fairness was in
the eye of the beholder, however; and thus this guidance was subject to the criticism that it was
effectively standardless. As one early commentator described it, “‘Equity is a Roguish thing: for
Law we have a measure, know what to trust to; Equity is according to the Conscience of him
that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so is Equity.’” CLERMONT, supra, at 25.
Judicial reforms involving simplification of procedural rules beginning in the 1800s resulted in
the merger of law and equity courts so that today, in almost all states, the same judges “sit” both
in law and in equity, and the combined courts (now usually called civil courts) are entitled to
award both legal and equitable remedies. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra, at 541–45; Main,
supra, at 464–76. The standard for deciding cases that were equitable in nature also evolved
significantly, initially as a result of the critique against the standardlessness of the historical
fairness and justice test, but then because law itself had become increasingly pervasive; areas of
human interaction previously untouched or “inadequately” addressed were now dealt with in
meticulous detail either by statute or by operation of the common law. See, e.g., infra notes 51–
59 and accompanying text (discussing the seminal pediatric sibling transplant case Masden v.
Harrison, in which the court sitting in equity adopted a version of the law’s “best interests”
standard to decide the case); infra notes 113–22 and accompanying text (discussing the
increased statutory regulation of the court’s probate jurisdiction). Thus, where a court in an
action seeking an equitable remedy previously could examine the substantive issues involved
according to their inherent equities, today the rules of decision are typically detailed in the
states’ and/or the federal government’s statutory and case law; and certainly, where their law is
on point, a court cannot ignore its applicability. See, e.g., Marc E. Tarlock, Voluntary Departure
and the Right to Reopen Removal Proceedings on the Merits, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 613, 635
n.125 (citing Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 194 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Having concluded,
however, that [the statutory provision] precludes judicial review . . . we cannot evade this
statutory directive by resort to equity.”)).
47 Given that the medical procedure was novel and that the law generally evolves to address
real controversies, this is not surprising. See Pristave & Watson, supra note 31, at 8.
48 The closest precedent was an out-of-jurisdiction (thus not binding) case, Bonner v.
Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941), which suggested in dicta (which is also not binding) that
a parent probably could consent to the use of her child as a skin donor for a needy cousin. On
the facts, although the child himself had apparently consented to be used as an organ source for
his cousin, his mother was not informed of the transplant before it took place, and thus the
doctor at issue was found liable in battery. The case is typically understood to stand for the
legally non-controversial proposition that parental consent is required before a non-emergency
surgical procedure can be performed on a minor. See, e.g., Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 851
F.2d 437, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing Bonner for the rule that “[i]n the case of a minor patient,
the relevant consent is that of the parents”).
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was primarily focused on neglect. 49 And the law’s overarching,
individual-child-centered “best interests” standard had not been applied
in an obviously analogous situation. This legal backdrop imposed some,
but not particularly constraining, boundaries on the justices who were
otherwise free to operate according to equity’s first principles of fairness
and justice. 50 That is, the justices clearly believed that they could not
permit the parties to proceed in the absence of consent; and they
apparently believed that it was a good idea, if not even required, that
they find the surgery to be (also) in the interests of the healthy child. But
their hands were not otherwise tied.
The seminal case in the trilogy is Masden v. Harrison, decided in
June of 1957. 51 The parties in Masden, including the children, sought to
establish the right of twin nineteen-year-old boys and their mother to
consent to the removal of a kidney from the healthy twin (Leonard) to
benefit his brother (Leon) whose own kidneys had failed; indeed, Leon
was described as “fast approaching a terminal condition and the only
hope of saving his life is to perform a kidney transplant operation.”52
Because the surgery would obviously not result in any physical benefit
to the healthy twin, the parties developed the two-pronged argument
that the surgery was in his psychological best interest as it would allow
him to do what he could to save the life of his treasured sibling, and that
his psychological welfare was of overwhelming developmental
significance. Specifically, they argued that
if this operation is not performed and Leon dies . . . a grave
emotional impact on Leonard would result. . . . [which] would be
further aggravated by the realization that it was within his power to
have saved the life of his brother had this operation been
performed. 53

Lacking even a single close precedent to support the proposition that
surgery could proceed on the basis of these non-physical interests, the
parties, and ultimately the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, chose
to rest the argument and decision on the United States Supreme Court’s
then-recent, seemingly inapposite decision in Brown v. Board of

49 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 24 (West 1954) (defining the maltreated child as
one “without necessary and proper physical, educational or moral care and discipline,
or . . . growing up under conditions or circumstances damaging to [his] sound character
development, or who lacks proper attention of parent, guardian with care and custody, or
custodian, and whose parents or guardian are unwilling, incompetent or unavailable to provide
such care”); see also id. (West 1957) (same).
50 See supra note 46 (describing the history of equity jurisdiction and its standards).
51 Masden v. Harrison, No. 68651 (Mass. Eq. June 12, 1957) (decision on file with author).
52 Id. at 2.
53 Id.
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Education. 54 In particular, to support its finding that “[s]uch emotional
disturbance could well affect the health and physical well-being of
Leonard for the remainder of his life” 55 and thus that “this operation is
[also] necessary for the continued good health and future well-being of
Leonard,”56 the opinion in Masden cites the latter part of Brown in
which the Court describes the developmental and lifelong impact of the
social stigma and psychological injuries suffered by black children as a
result of school segregation. 57 Masden does not otherwise discuss
Brown; however, the point implied by the citation appears to be that
sometimes, psychological and developmental benefit (at least if these
can be said also to implicate the individual’s future physical welfare) can
justify enormous social and jurisprudential upheaval, such as that which
was involved in desegregating the public schools and in allowing a
parent to consent to the cutting open of a healthy child to remove an
organ for someone else’s benefit. 58 Ultimately, Masden held that “it is
proper for the [surgeons] with the assistance of [the hospital] to perform
the operation herein described with the consent of all the plaintiffs
without incurring any civil liability to Leonard or any criminal
prosecution.” 59
The second and third cases in the trilogy were Huskey v. Harrison 60
and Foster v. Harrison, 61 decided by different justices just several
months later, in August 1957 and November 1957, respectively. These
cases apparently cemented both the declaratory judgment procedure as
the vehicle to obtain lawful consent to perform pediatric sibling
transplants and (at least in Massachusetts) the substantive right of
54 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Masden court did cite two other cases but neither was
sufficiently helpful. See Masden, No. 68651, at 3 (citing Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C.
Cir. 1941) (suggesting that a parent might be able to consent to the use of her child as a skin
donor); Reddington v. Clayman, 134 N.E.2d 920 (Mass. 1956) (concerning an unconsented-to
blood transfusion)).
55 Masden, No. 68651, at 4.
56 Id. Specifically, the court noted that “in performing the operation the defendants are
conferring a benefit upon Leonard as well as upon Leon.” Id.
57 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 (noting that for young “negro” children, race-based segregation
“generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone” and that “this finding is amply supported by
modern [psychological] authority”).
58 Brown is often described as the first (or at least the first notable) decision to accept that
psychological and developmental harm could have such far-reaching legal implications. See,
e.g., Pristave & Watson, supra note 31, at 10 n.4; Carroll Seron, Foreword, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
419, 420–21 (2010). Given the concerns raised by commentators and judges in later pediatric
sibling transplant cases about the value of psychological harm evidence, it is interesting that the
Supreme Court’s reliance on this argument in Brown was also controversial from the start. See,
e.g., John Hart Ely, If at First You Don’t Succeed, Ignore the Question Next Time? Group Harm
in Brown v. Board of Education and Loving v. Virginia, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 215 (1998).
59 Masden, No. 68651, at 4.
60 Huskey v. Harrison, No. 68666 (Mass. Eq. Aug. 30, 1957) (decision on file with author).
61 Foster v. Harrison, No. 68674 (Mass. Eq. Nov. 20, 1957) (decision on file with author).
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parents and physicians to use healthy minor children as organ sources
for their ill siblings so long as judicial authorization was obtained in
advance. The cases also appear to have cemented the factual
prerequisites for judicial authorization in this early period, including an
urgent need for a transplant, the likelihood that the transplant would be
successful in saving the life of the ill sibling, a close genetic and personal
relationship between the siblings, the likelihood that because of this
relationship the healthy child would suffer grave emotional and
developmental harm if she were not permitted to donate an organ, and
the consent (in the colloquial sense of that word) of everyone involved
including the children. Notably, neither the Masden nor the Huskey
decision mentions the harms and risks inherent in the surgery on the
healthy child; 62 the requirement that these be relatively minimal only
emerged in Foster, the final case in the trilogy. 63
Huskey involved a joint request by Dolores and Doris, who were
almost fifteen, and their parents. Dolores was described as being within
hours or days of death should she not receive a transplant, and the
transplant itself was described as likely to succeed given that the girls
were identical twins. 64 In contrast with the Masden opinion, the Huskey
opinion is short and cursory: It notes that everyone involved had
consented to the surgeries, including Doris; that the surgeons and the
hospital would not proceed in the absence of court approval because
they had been warned that without such approval they “may be subject
to civil liability and criminal prosecution”; that “if this operation is not
performed and Dolores dies, there is the risk of grave emotional impact
on Doris”; and thus that “this operation is necessary for the future wellbeing of Doris and that in this respect performance of the operation will
confer a benefit upon Doris as well as upon Dolores.” 65 And it concludes
as Masden did, that the operations could proceed without the surgeons
or the hospital incurring any civil or criminal liability. 66 Throughout,
Masden is the only precedent cited by the Court. Masden’s own meager
scaffolding, Brown v. Board of Education, thus disappears (forever, as it
turns out) as a legal foundation for the right of courts to authorize
parents to consent to the use of their minor children as organ sources
for their ill siblings. Also gone without any comment is Masden’s
suggestion—possibly also based in Brown and the evidence presented in
that case 67—that averting eventual physical harm (as a consequence or
Neither opinion or order references these harms and risks.
See infra note 71 and accompanying text (finally noting these inherent harms and risks).
64 Huskey, No. 68666, at 1–2.
65 Id. at 1–2.
66 Id. at 3.
67 For example, in its famous “Footnote 11” in Brown, 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954), the
Court cited GUNNAR MYRDAL WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF RICHARD STERNER & ARNOLD ROSE,
AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY (1944), available at
62
63
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manifestation of grave emotional suffering) is important to offset the
physical injury that is organ retrieval surgery; from Huskey forward,
there has been no mention of this equation in the available decisions.
Foster v. Harrison involved a request by the children’s mother for
authorization to consent to the use of her fourteen-year-old son Carl as
an organ donor for his ill sibling Clyde, who was also fourteen. 68 In
contrast to the Masden and Huskey opinions, the Foster opinion appears
to be both procedurally distinct in some of its aspects and also richer
and more nuanced in terms of the analysis, particularly in its attention
to matters of concern to Carl. Thus, it appears that the case was brought
by the boys’ mother alone; at least the court did not emphasize the fact
of their status as parties. 69 The court noted that “[p]reliminary tests
indicate that Carl and Clyde are identical twins”; 70 that “Carl appears to
be in good health and medical opinion is that no unusual risks are
involved to Carl beyond the inevitable risk of a major surgical operation
and the hazards incident to having only one kidney in the event of later
injury to that one kidney”; 71 that Clyde was in declining health and
would die “in a relatively short period” unless he could get a kidney
from his twin—that “[s]uch an operation is the only hope of saving
Clyde’s life”; 72 and that “[a]lthough the operation could be postponed
for a time, it has a greater chance of success in saving Clyde if performed
before Clyde’s condition reaches an emergency state.” 73 Notably, the
Foster court also undertook to document the basis for finding that Carl
had consented:
[Carl] is a boy of fourteen with good understanding and intelligence.
He has been fully informed of, and understands the nature of the
operation and its possible risks and consequences. He has talked with
a donor of a kidney in a similar operation. . . . Carl and his mother

https://archive.org/download/AmericanDilemmaTheNegroProblemAndModernDemocracy/
AmericanDelemmaVersion2.pdf. Among other things, Myrdal details the extraordinary extent
of discrimination in education in the Jim Crow South, MYRDAL, supra, at 337–44, and then
writes
[m]ortality in all age groups is much higher among Negroes than among whites.
Negroes suffer more from nearly all sorts of illnesses. We have shown that at least the
major part of these differentials is not due to greater susceptibility on the part of
Negroes but to the impact of economic, educational, and cultural handicaps, directly
or indirectly imposed upon Negroes by discrimination.
Id. at 344 (footnotes omitted). It is this portion of the Brown decision upon which the Masden
court originally relied.
68 Foster v. Harrison, No. 68674, at 1–2 (Mass. Eq. Nov. 20, 1957) (decision on file with
author).
69 Id. at 1.
70 Id. at 2.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
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desire that the operation take place and Carl’s consent to it is the
result of his own decision, free from pressure or coercion, made with
admirable courage, generosity, and appreciation of the factors
involved. 74

And, perhaps because the likelihood of saving the ill patient’s life, and
thus the payoff from the transplant, is not always as clear as it had been
portrayed in Masden and Huskey, 75 the Foster court also described in
detail the benefits of the surgeries to Carl:
I also find . . . (1) that if this operation is not performed and Clyde
dies, there is danger of serious emotional impact upon Carl, and (2)
that, because the risk of emotional disturbance will be reduced and
because of the probability that Carl will be enabled by the operation
to have the continued companionship of his twin brother, Carl will
receive a benefit from the operation, and (3) that the operation, if the
doctors decide to perform it, is necessary to Carl’s future welfare and
happiness. 76

Foster’s contribution is subtle, but it is real: It does not obviously add
new factors to those established in Masden—indeed, in its own citations
only to Masden and Huskey it cements the trilogy as the only foundation
for the right of parents to use their healthy minor children as organ
sources for their ill siblings. However, in its evaluation of those factors,
it does suggest that the nature of the transaction is more ambiguous
than it appeared at least in the written decisions in the first two cases. It
also suggests that it is important to acknowledge that ambiguity, and
thus to focus attention on the physical and psychological implications
for the healthy child, including particularly his mental capacity and
stated desires.
In the fourteen years between late 1957 and 1972, when the next
publicly available decision was rendered, there is some legal activity on a
related point—whether a court can authorize the transfer of a kidney
from an adult incompetent to his adult brother 77—but none that I could
Id. at 2–3.
See Pristave & Watson, supra note 31, at 11 (noting that both Dolores Huskey and Clyde
Foster died within months of the transplants).
76 Foster, No. 68674, at 3.
77 See Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969) (case in equity in which
chancery court decided that it had authority to manage and to make distributions from the
personal assets and estate of an adult incompetent; that an adult incompetent’s kidneys are
among the assets over which it has control; that the doctrine of substituted judgment, applied
using best interests principles since the individual had never previously been competent, was
the governing standard; and that as applied in the case it was in the psychological best interests
of the adult incompetent to donate a kidney to his brother because they were so close). Strunk
becomes relevant to the modern cases because it provides the roadmap for getting into equity
through the probate courts after it is abolished in other contexts. See supra note 46 and
accompanying text (discussing the history and evolution of equity jurisdiction); infra notes
129–36 and accompanying text (discussing this probate strategy).
74
75
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find involving minors. 78 Nevertheless, one can reasonably suppose that
as medical transplant capability developed to include non-identical
siblings and organs other than skin and kidneys, most notably bone
marrow, 79 minors were sometimes sought out as organ sources80 and
courts were sometimes if not always asked either for pre-authorization
or to ratify existing consents. 81 In other words, the dearth of published
or available judicial decisions is not a sign of inactivity either by
surgeons or by courts given that lower level state courts rarely draft
opinions to accompany their decisions, perhaps particularly when they
are rendered in emergent circumstances; moreover, there is a
documented inclination to seal the records in these cases in particular. 82
The 1972 case Hart v. Brown, decided by a Connecticut state court
also sitting in equity, 83 considered whether to permit the parent
petitioners to consent to a sibling kidney transplant from their healthy
seven-year-old daughter Margaret to her twin Kathleen. 84 Consistent
with the pattern established in the Massachusetts transplant trilogy, the
girls’ parents offered psychiatric testimony focusing on Margaret’s best
interests, suggesting that
the donor has a strong identification with her twin sister. . . . that if
the expected successful results are achieved they would be of
immense benefit to the donor in that the donor would be better off in
a family that was happy than in a family that was distressed

78 The literature does reference some additional but apparently still unavailable decisions.
See, e.g., Pristave & Watson, supra note 31, at 10 n.5 (“[B]etween 1970 and 1973, the
Massachusetts courts decided more than seven additional cases of incompetent kidney donors
in unpublished opinions.” (citing Charles H. Baron et al., Live Organ and Tissue Transplants
from Minor Donors in Massachusetts, 55 B.U. L. REV. 159 (1975))).
79 The first successful transfer of kidneys between fraternal twins and non-twin siblings,
respectively, dates to 1959 and 1960. A Timeline of Kidney Transplantation, MED. U. S.C.,
http://waring.library.musc.edu/exhibits/kidney/Transplantation.php (last visited Mar. 14,
2014). The first successful transfer of bone marrow between non-identical minor twins dates to
1968. History of Transplantation, supra note 37; Kendra D. MacLeod et al., Pediatric Sibling
Donors of Successful and Unsuccessful Hematopoietic Stem Cell Transplants (HSCT): A
Qualitative Study of Their Psychosocial Experience, 28 J. PEDIATRIC PSYCHOL. 223 (2003); see
also AAP Policy Statement, supra note 32 (describing this history and analyzing the ethical
implications of the practice generally).
80 As a group of medical commentators noted in the context of bone marrow and stem cell
transplantation, because “[a] sibling is more likely to be a compatible donor than parents,
relatives, or strangers,” as transplants “increase in number, so does the number of pediatric
sibling donors.” MacLeod et al., supra note 79, at 223.
81 Both the available medical and legal literatures strongly encouraged this ex ante judicial
review. See, e.g., Baron et al., supra note 78, at 161–62; Pristave & Watson, supra note 31, at 15.
82 See supra note 33 and accompanying text (noting this point and providing references).
83 289 A.2d 386, 387–88 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972) (discussing its decision to proceed in
equity, and emphasizing the courts’ historical authority to invoke equity in the interests of
legally incompetent persons and the sibling transplant precedents including the Massachusetts
trilogy which were also based in equity).
84 Id. at 386.
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and . . . that it would be a very great loss to the donor if the donee
were to die from her illness. 85

Parting ways with the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the Hart
court found only “limited value” in this testimony given “the ages of the
minors.” 86 Instead, the court chose to focus its attentions very
differently, on “whether it should abandon the donee to a brief
medically complicated life and eventual death or permit the natural
parents to take some action based on reason and medical probability in
order to keep both children alive.” 87 In analyzing this question the court
“balanc[ed] . . . the rights of the natural parents . . . . to keep both
children alive” against “the rights of the donor child,” 88 and ultimately
affirmed the right of the girls’ parents to use Margaret as an organ
source for Kathleen:
[T]he operation on the donee is a necessity for her continued
life; . . . there are negligible risks involved to both donor and
donee; . . . to subject the donee to a parental homograft may be cruel
and inhuman because of the possible side effects of the
immunosuppressive drugs; . . . the prognosis for good health and
long life to both children is excellent; . . . there is no known
opposition to having the operations performed; . . . it will be most
beneficial to the donee; and . . . it will be of some benefit to the
donor.89

With respect to Margaret in particular, the court noted that she was
“informed of the operation and insofar as she may be capable of
understanding she desires to donate her kidney so that her sister may
return to her,” 90 but otherwise gave little weight (as it said it would) to
the psychiatric testimony. It also apparently ignored (or was never
provided evidence detailing) the threshold injury that was the surgical
intrusion itself. Instead, it emphasized only the likely physical
implications of that surgery in the short and long term:
Of 3000 recorded kidney operations of live donors, there is reported
only one death of a donor, and even this death may have been from
causes unrelated to the procedure. The short-range risk to a donor is
negligible. The operating surgeon testified that the surgical risk is no
more than the risk of the anesthesia. The operative procedure would
last about two and one-half hours. There would be some minor
postoperative pain but no more than in any other surgical procedure.
The donor would be hospitalized for about eight days and would be
85
86
87
88
89
90

Id. at 389.
Id. at 390.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 391.
Id. at 389.
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able to resume normal activities in thirty days. Assuming an
uneventful recovery, the donor would thereafter be restricted only
from violent contact sports. She would be able to engage in all of the
normal life activities of an active young girl. Medical testimony
indicated that the risk to the donor is such that life insurance
actuaries do not rate such individuals higher than those with two
kidneys. The only real risk would be trauma to the one remaining
kidney, but testimony indicated that such trauma is extremely rare in
civilian life. 91

Hart is mostly cited for being the only published decision out of
any court to authorize the use of a healthy minor child as an organ
donor. 92 However, the case is ultimately most notable for its rejection of
the Massachusetts court’s emphasis on the psychological best interests
of the donee and its adoption instead of a balancing test that takes into
account not only the interests of the healthy sibling but also those of her
sister (in a chance at life) and her parents (in saving their ill child). It is
also notable for its appointment of guardians ad litem (GALs) to
represent the separate interests of each of the girls in this balancing
process, and for its focus on community ethical norms (as described by
a member of the clergy and evaluated independently by the court
itself) 93 as the foundation for its overarching approach. With respect to
the latter, it is significant that, in a concluding paragraph, the Hart court
returned to the fact that it was sitting in equity:
Justice will be accomplished in this case. . . . To prohibit the natural
parents and the guardians ad litem of the minor children the right to
give their consent under these circumstances, where there is
supervision by this court and other persons in examining their
judgment, would be most unjust, inequitable and injudicious. 94

Two years later, in the 1974 bone marrow case Nathan v.
Farinelli, 95 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court itself adopted a
version of the Hart court’s balancing test. 96 Still sitting in equity,

Id.
The Texas Court of Civil Appeal’s 1979 decision in Little v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1979), involved a fourteen-year-old prospective donor; however, because the
mother’s lawyer’s legal strategy involved having the child declared an “incompetent” so that
they could get into probate court and avail themselves of the more favorable legal climate in
that context, her status as a child was irrelevant to the decision. See infra notes 129–39 and
accompanying text (discussing this strategy and its consequences).
93 Hart, 289 A.2d at 389–90.
94 Id. at 391.
95 Nathan v. Farinelli, No. 74-87 (Mass. Eq. July 3, 1974) (on file with author).
96 There is some evidence that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court actually adopted
this standard earlier in the same year. The Farinelli opinion and order references a case,
Camitta v. Schillinger, No. 74-18 (Mass. Eq. Jan. 31, 1974 and Mar. 8, 1974), which it says also
used this standard. Farinelli, No. 74-87, at 6–7. I have not been able to confirm this.
91
92
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perhaps for the last time, 97 the court rejected its prior position that “a
finding of benefit to the donor is essential, or that the absence of such a
finding is fatal, to the allowance of such a transplant.” 98 Indeed, it found
that “[t]o require a finding of benefit to the donor, and particularly to
accept a psychological benefit as sufficient, often seems to invite
testimony conjured to satisfy the requirement by words but not by
substance.”99 Not surprisingly, the petition to allow the transplant was
deficient in this regard—“the evidence does not permit a finding that
the procedure will be of any benefit to Toni” 100—as the psychiatrist in
the case had testified that “it can be hoped that serving as the donor may
confer some psychological benefit upon Toni in later years but that it
would be indulging in speculation to attempt to predict now whether
that hope would be realized.” 101 Thus, the Farinelli court found that
a better approach . . . is to consider that the primary right and
responsibility for deciding the delicate question of whether bone
marrow should be taken from [six-year-old] Toni and transplanted
in [ten-year-old] William is that of the parents with reference to both
children. However, because of the possibility of a conflict between
their responsibility for the care and custody of William and their
similar responsibility for Toni, their decision to grant consent for the
transplantation . . . is subject to review by a court under its broad
equity powers. 102

Specifically, the court described its role as being to determine “whether
the parents’ decision . . . is fair and reasonable in the . . . circumstances”
and this is done by “weigh[ing] and balanc[ing] the individual interests
of the two children.” 103 Thus,
[o]n the one hand the court must consider the nature and urgency of
William’s physical condition, his need for the transplant, the
probable benefit to him from the transplant, the probable risks or
consequences to him if the transplantation is withheld, and the
availability and efficacy of alternative methods of treatment for his
condition; and on the other hand it must consider Toni’s physical
condition, the nature and extent of her physical participation in the
97 In its decision the court noted that the “bill in equity” is “now called a ‘civil action’ under
the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure which took effect on July 1, 1974,” that is, postfiling but immediately before the hearing. Farinelli, No. 74-87, at 2.
98 Id. at 6.
99 Id. at 7. Citing the dissent in Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969), and Curran’s
1959 Article, supra note 39, the court added, “I prefer the approach of the psychiatrist who
testified in this case that she would be speculating if she ventured any opinion about the
psychological effect of either allowing or preventing the intended donor from furnishing the
bone marrow which is to be transplanted.” Farinelli, No. 74-87, at 7.
100 Farinelli, No. 74-87, at 3.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 10.
103 Id. at 11.
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transplant, and the probable and possible risks and consequences to
her by reason of her participation. 104

In this case, the parents’ decision to subject Toni to surgery to remove
her bone marrow for William’s benefit was determined to be “fair and
reasonable as to Toni” because the risks inherent in that procedure were
outweighed by the benefits that would inure to William from the
transplant. 105 Specifically, the risks as to Toni were described as
“minimal. . . . consist[ing] of possible adverse reactions to general
anesthesia, and possible infection.”106 (As was the case in Hart, the
Farinelli court did not address the physical harms inherent in the
procedure itself.) 107 On the other hand, William was suffering from
aplastic anemia, which was likely to be fatal unless he could get a bone
marrow transplant; such transplants were not a cure, but at the time
they were said to be of benefit in fifty percent of the cases. Toni was the
only bone marrow match they could find. 108 Although not directly on
point, the court also inferred that “it will be a source of comfort,
satisfaction and psychological benefit to the parents to know that a
transplant is performed for William whose chances of survival without
it are dubious at best.” 109
Farinelli is particularly notable both for following the Hart court’s
substantive approach to deciding these cases using a combination of
parental rights and responsibilities principles and a balancing test
involving consideration of the two children’s independent interests; for
rejecting psychological best interests testimony as speculative, at least on
facts involving prospective donors who are not yet adolescents; and for
its procedural history, including especially its expansion of the role of
the healthy child’s GAL. Although the Hart court also used GALs,
Farinelli appears to have been the first case in which the healthy child’s
GAL appeared as a party with full adversarial capacities. Thus, for
example, Toni’s GAL—Garrick Cole—filed both cross- and counterclaims, requesting, among other things, that the court order the hospital
to obtain and pay for insurance to cover any additional harms Toni
might suffer as a consequence of the procedure should it be
authorized. 110 Cole was also considered by the hospital to be an eventual
proxy for consent purposes should the court decide the parents were
incapable of providing lawful consent. 111 It is probably not a coincidence

104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111

Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
See supra note 91 and accompanying text (discussing this omission in Hart).
Farinelli, No. 74-87, at 1.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 2.
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that Cole subsequently co-authored an Article about the role of GALs in
this context. 112 This Article remains an important template for
academics and practitioners considering the issue how best to protect
the interests of the healthy child in sibling transplant cases.
B.

The Later Decisions in Probate

In the period around the time Farinelli was decided, a few related
developments were beginning to influence the way courts could treat
requests for authorization to use of minors as organ sources for their ill
siblings. First, as harked in Farinelli itself, 113 state legislatures were
continuing to reduce the scope of the judiciary’s equity jurisdiction.
This happened in different states at different times, but of particular
note here, at some point the courts’ substantive equity powers were no
longer automatically triggered by a petition seeking a declaratory
judgment, and even where the courts’ equity powers were still at issue,
their authority to decide cases simply on the basis of fairness and justice
principles was fading fast. 114 As I have already explained, this happened
in part because these principles had long been considered standardless,
allowing individual judges to decide cases essentially on the basis of
their personal inclinations, but also because the principal justification
for resorting to equity—the absence of applicable law—was mostly no
longer available. 115 Indeed, by this time in American legal history,
applicable law had developed in most areas including in the area of
parental rights and the things parents could and could not do to their
children. Thus, the states’ maltreatment laws had been redrawn
beginning in the early-to-mid-1960s to shift the focus of the inquiry
away from parents’ rights and motives to the right of the individual
child to be free from parentally-inflicted serious (primarily physical)
harm. 116 (This shift was itself a product of developments in pediatric
medicine 117 and in the social movements of the civil rights era.) 118 In
doing so, the states began specifically to define unlawful “abuse” to
include “non-accidental physical injury to a child,” and to include in
that category such injuries as cuts, bruises, burns, and the like, which
Baron et al., supra note 78.
See supra note 97 and accompanying text (noting that the Farinelli court acknowledged
the shift in the midst of its consideration of that case).
114 See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing the history of equity jurisdiction).
115 Id.
116 Coleman, supra note 12, at 550.
117 See C. Henry Kempe et al., The Battered-Child Syndrome, 181 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 17
(1962); Jessica R. Givelber, Note, Imposing Duties on Witnesses to Child Sexual Abuse: A Futile
Response to Bystander Indifference, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3169 (1999).
118 See, e.g., Joel F. Handler, Continuing Relationships and the Administrative Process: Social
Welfare, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 687, 694 (situating children’s rights movement in this context).
112
113
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were not justified by an offsetting benefit to the child herself. 119 Notably,
apart from lawful corporal punishment, the states did not find, and to
date have not found, psychological and developmental benefits to be
sufficiently offsetting—even if these could be proven non-speculative
and thus established to a court’s satisfaction. 120 These developments
made it increasingly difficult to obtain judicial ratification of parental
consents to pediatric sibling transplants according to the procedures
and standards established in the Massachusetts transplant trilogy and
adapted in Hart and Farinelli. Thus, the question “whether this court
can [authorize such a transplant] in the exercise of its equity powers”121
increasingly had to be answered in the negative. In this landscape it is
not surprising that proponents of the right to use minor children as
sources of bone marrow for their ill relatives turned to state legislatures
for statutory authorization; this alternative was successful, but only in
two states, and only for bone marrow. 122
So what did parents, doctors, hospitals, and their lawyers do? The
answer is not clear. That is, although the older medical literature
consistently advised doctors and hospitals to get judicial authorization
in advance of a transplant procedure involving a minor donor, 123 I have
found nothing in either the medical or the legal literature that explains
119 See Coleman, supra note 12, at 549–52; Doriane Lambelet Coleman et al., Where and
How to Draw the Line Between Reasonable Corporal Punishment and Abuse, 73 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 115–16 (2010).
120 See Coleman, supra note 12, at 569–70.
121 Nathan v. Farinelli, No. 74-87, at 4–5 (Mass. Eq. July 3, 1974) (on file with author).
122 See ALA. CODE § 22-8-9 (1975) (permitting some adolescent minors to consent to a bone
marrow donation so long as this is “for the purpose of bone marrow transplantation”; and
providing that a “parent or legal guardian may consent to such bone marrow donation on
behalf of any other minor.”); WIS. STAT. ANN § 146.34 (West 2014) (permitting the parent,
guardian, or legal custodian of a child under twelve to use a minor child as a bone marrow
source for an ill sibling so long as certain conditions are met; and permitting a child who is
twelve or older himself under certain circumstances to consent to a pediatric sibling
transplant). That Alabama should be one of the states providing unrestricted authority for
minors fourteen years of age and older to consent to donate their bone marrow (including to
non-family members and for research) is not surprising given that it is also one of the few states
that authorizes children beginning at this age to consent to general medical treatment. See
Doriane Lambelet Coleman & Philip M. Rosoff, The Legal Authority of Mature Minors to
Consent to General Medical Treatment, 131 PEDIATRICS 786 (2013) (discussing ALA. CODE
§ 22-8-9 (2014)).
123 See, e.g., Pristave & Watson, supra note 31, at 15. This admonition makes even more
sense in the current legal landscape than it did at the time the Brigham defendants originally
adopted the strategy. That is, the concern today is not merely that parents of a child who is ill or
injured to the point of needing a transplant have an inherent conflict of interest that may void
their consent to any use of a different child as an organ source, it is also that the law clearly
defines as abuse an intentional, unnecessary (to the individual herself) cut of the sort involved
in these surgeries. Thus, even if one could imagine the conflict away, there is still another
important barrier that requires consideration. The potential for legal liability in circumstances
where the donor child would complain is thus more salient. Given this, it is troublesome that
the American Academy of Pediatrics would adopt the position that authorization from a court
is no longer necessary. See infra notes 177–78 and accompanying text (discussing this move).
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how such authorizations could be obtained or that discusses the
metaphorical brick walls that are the legal doctrines that now stand in
their way. Thus, although it is likely that hospital general counsels and
their outside lawyers know what works on the ground in their particular
locales, the broader story must be pieced together from a combination
of the few cases that have seen the light of day since Hart and what we
know of some hospitals’ internal procedures and experiences.
As a threshold matter, although there is some indication that the
numbers may be in decline, it is clear that minors continue to be used as
organ sources for their ill siblings. 124 It is likely that healthy children are
most often used as bone marrow sources given how relatively acceptable
this procedure seems to be. 125 It is also probably true that healthy
children continue to be used as kidney sources for their ill siblings; 126
indeed, one can reasonably surmise that the number of kidney
harvesting procedures involving pediatric patients likely increased after
the surgery became laparoscopic and thus less medically intrusive and
risky for the donor in the operative and post-operative periods. 127
Finally, one can speculate that healthy children already have been or
(because the medical possibilities are there) likely will be used as sources
for other organs that are presently harvested from living adult donors;
according to the federal government’s Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Network these include livers, lungs, pancreases,
intestines, and hearts. 128
124 See Olbrisch et al., supra note 34, at 242 (providing data on the numbers of healthy
children used as organ sources in the current period and also claiming that these numbers may
be on the decline); see also supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text (providing additional
references).
125 See AAP Policy Statement, supra note 32, at 392 (“Children often serve as hematopoietic
stem cell donors, most commonly for their siblings.”).
126 See generally Olbrisch et al., supra note 34, at 242 (providing some available data on
kidney harvesting); Pristave & Watson, supra note 31, passim (discussing the ethics and law
involved in this procedure and giving guidance to medical providers engaged in the practice).
127 Michael D. Fabrizio et al., Laparoscopic Live Donor Nephrectomy, JOHNS HOPKINS BRADY
UROLOGICAL INST., http://urology.jhu.edu/surgical_techniques/nephrectomy/index.html (last
visited Mar. 21, 2014) (describing the benefits of laparoscopic kidney harvesting from the
donor’s perspective).
128 Organ and Tissue Donation from Living Donors, U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH & HUM.
SERVICES, http://www.organdonor.gov/about/livedonation.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2014)
(“Living individuals can donate one of the two kidneys . . . . one of two lobes of their liver. . . . a
lung or part of a lung, part of the pancreas, or part of the intestines. . . . Surprisingly, it is also
possible for a living person to donate a heart, but only if he or she is receiving a replacement
heart.”). Notably, the Network’s online information includes the aside that “[g]enerally, living
donors should be . . . between the ages of 18 and 60.” Id. (emphasis added). The Network’s
transplantation data reveals that from 1988–2013, minors (seventeen years old or younger)
made living donations of two hearts and fifteen livers. Living Donors Recovered in the U.S. by
Donor Age, U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/
latestData/step2.asp (last visited Mar. 14, 2014) (Step 1: “Choose Category” select “Donor” and
“Choose Organ” select “All”; Step 2: follow “Living Donors by Donor Age” hyperlink; “Add
Field to Report:” select “Organ (6 items)”). The Network’s references to living heart donors,
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It is also clear that motivated lawyers with the right facts can be
quite creative in their use of the judiciary’s remaining equity
jurisdiction. The 1979 decision in Little v. Little 129 out of the Texas
Court of Civil Appeals is exemplary in this respect. The petitioner in
Little was the mother of two children, fourteen-year-old Anne and her
younger brother Stephen. Stephen was suffering from end-stage-renal
disease and needed a kidney transplant. Anne, who had Down
syndrome, was apparently a match. A week before their mother
petitioned for authorization to use Anne as an organ donor, she
petitioned the probate court to have Anne declared “of unsound mind”
and to have herself appointed as Anne’s guardian. This was done.130
Although it is not unusual for a parent of a mentally disabled child to
seek such declarations, unless the child has separate assets it is not
obviously important to do so until she reaches the age of majority since,
before then, her parents are already the “natural guardian[] of [her]
person.” 131 Thus, Anne’s mother did not need to be appointed
“guardian” to make all decisions for her including the decision “to
consent to surgical intrusions upon [her] person.” 132 The problem,
however, was that the right of “natural guardians” (parents) in the latter
respect are “limited to the power to consent to medical ‘treatment.’” 133
And the Little court was clear that
[e]ven ascribing to the word “treatment” its broadest definition, it is,
nevertheless, limited to “the steps taken to effect a cure of an injury
or disease . . . including examination and diagnosis as well as
application of remedies.”
We cannot accept the guardian’s argument that a donor
nephrectomy constitutes medical treatment for the donor. In this
case the ward’s mental incompetency results from the fact that she
suffers from Down’s Syndrome . . . . [and] the guardian does not
contend that removal of a kidney is a medically acceptable method of
curing or treating Down’s Syndrome . . . . We think it is clear that the
and to the inclusion of children among those donors, is likely unrelated to the pediatric sibling
transplant context. That is, it is likely that the donor children in these cases were also in need of
medical need, and that harvesting their heart was necessary to address that need. See also AAP
Clinical Report, supra note 34, at 454 (noting that “[l]iving donors have also provided segments
of livers and, less frequently, lungs, pancreases, intestines, and skin for transplantation” and
that “[a]lthough minors are more likely to be organ recipients than living donors, minors have
served as living donors”).
129 576 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
130 Id. at 494.
131 TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 676(b) (West 2013) (repealed 2014) (“If the parents live
together, both parents are the natural guardians of the person of the minor children by the
marriage, and one of the parents is entitled to be appointed guardian of the children’s estates.”).
132 Little, 576 S.W.2d at 495; see also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602–03 (1979); Coleman,
supra note 12, at 545–49; Coleman & Rosoff, supra note 122.
133 Little, 576 S.W.2d at 495.
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medical procedure authorized by the probate court in this case
constitutes “treatment” of the ward’s brother, Stephen, and that the
proposed medical procedure has as its purpose curing, remedying or
ameliorating the condition of the proposed donee of the ward’s
kidney. 134

What was apparently not so limited was the power of a “guardian” (who
might in that state be a parent appointed as guardian) to “distribute” her
ward’s “estate” according to equitable principles. That is, using the 1969
Kentucky Court of Appeals decision in Strunk v. Strunk as a model, 135
Little’s legal strategy was apparently to get access to a court that would
agree to imagine that a kidney was not part of a child’s “person” but
rather a part of her “estate” so that it could be harvested from her body
and “distributed” or “gifted” in ways that the law (which spoke only to
“treatment”) otherwise would not allow. (The intellectual gymnastics
really are quite astounding.) Of course Strunk itself involved an adult
incompetent as donor, not a minor; 136 however, this distinction was
irrelevant to the Little court since it had based its jurisdiction in the first
instance on the erasure of Anne’s status as a child.
In any event, Little’s strategy was successful. Applying a hybrid of
probate law’s traditional best interests and substituted judgment tests, 137
the court found that because Anne was close to and cared about
Stephen, because she both missed him when he was away and knew she
could help him, and because she would be happy if he lived and sad if he
died, she would derive “substantial psychological benefits” from being a
donor and she likely would have agreed to the donation had she been
competent. 138 Finally, perhaps in response to the analysis in Farinelli,
the court added that although psychological prognostications can
sometimes be speculative, the best interests test often governs legal
outcomes and evidence of psychological benefit should not be ignored
in that context. 139
The next and final available decision authorizing a pediatric sibling
transplant is the 2003 decision in In re S.C., which is featured in the
introductory illustration. In my view, it represents the pinnacle of
creative lawyering in this area. Indeed, the petitioners’ jurisdictional and
134 Id. (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1673 (4th ed. 1968)).
135 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969); see supra note 77 and accompanying text (placing the Strunk
decision in the chronology of sibling transplant cases).
136 Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at 145.
137 Probate law has traditionally used best interests analysis in cases where incompetents
have never been competent; substituted judgment analysis is used where incompetents have
previously been competent and thus where there is evidence of how they would decide the issue
themselves. See, e.g., Little, 576 S.W.2d at 497–98.
138 Id. at 498–500.
139 Id. at 498–99.

COLEMAN.35.4 (Do Not Delete)

2014]

4/10/2014 2:22 PM

TESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF FAMILY

1317

related procedural arguments, adopted wholesale by the Alabama
probate judge in the case, arguably crossed both ethical and legal lines.
Recall that the case involved a six-year-old girl, J.C., who had been badly
injured in an accidental fire at her family’s home. 140 At the time J.C.’s
surgeon began contemplating skin transplants from her identical twin
sister S.C., the third-degree burns, which covered eighty percent of J.C.’s
body, were considered life threatening. 141 According to Professor
Samuel Tilden’s superbly detailed account of the case,
[a]fter the hospital administration was informed of the proposed
harvesting, the hospital medical director obtained a “curbside”
consultation from a pediatric ethicist in Ohio, who opined that
performance of the harvesting in Sydney would be tantamount to
child abuse. Thus, the hospital administration’s initial information
cautioned against going forward with the harvesting
procedures. . . . After the [hospital’s own] ethics committee’s
[contrary, positive] recommendation, the hospital’s attorneys
proposed seeking judicial determination in juvenile court, but later
reported that “feedback” for petitioning in juvenile court would not
be greeted enthusiastically by the judiciary. . . . [M]aybe the concept
of child abuse and neglect had not been fully put to rest. 142

In fact, the lawyers’ inquiry to the juvenile court made perfect sense
since, by 2003 when the matter was being evaluated, Alabama, like other
states, had already prohibited parentally-inflicted, non-accidental
physical injury to a child; this law was administered by the juvenile
courts (or the equivalent in states with different nomenclatures). 143 In
140 See supra notes 1–8 and accompanying text (introductory illustration); see also Tilden,
supra note 1, at 88 (describing the accident).
141 Tilden, supra note 1, at 88 (explaining that “only her head, hands, and intertriginous
areas were spared. Doctors estimated that [she] had a 30–50% chance of survival.”). Tilden
emphasizes, however, that by the time the procedures were performed, J.C.’s life was likely no
longer in jeopardy. Id. at 87–88, 107–09.
142 Id. at 97. Professor Tilden’s Article is an excellent summary of the facts of the case and an
analysis of the ethics and law on the subject of pediatric sibling transplants generally.
143 ALA. CODE § 26-14-1(1) (1975) (defining abuse as “[h]arm or threatened harm to a
child’s health or welfare,” and explaining that “[h]arm or threatened harm to a child’s health or
welfare can occur through nonaccidental physical or mental injury, sexual abuse or attempted
sexual abuse, or sexual exploitation or attempted sexual exploitation”). Section 26-14-3(a)
provides explicitly that hospitals and related medical providers are required to report suspected
abuse to the authorities in circumstances where it is suspected, including when they are “called
upon to render aid or medical assistance to any child.” Id. § 26-14-3(a). Professor Tilden
suggests that “[a]s much of the case law applicable here derived from probate or circuit court
decisions, a recommendation to petition the juvenile court to hear this case seemed misplaced.”
Tilden, supra note 1, at 97. As I explain above, this is incorrect since, by 2003 the equitable basis
for the prior sibling transplant decisions (both those rendered in probate and in the circuit
courts) had diminished so substantially that it was formally unavailable. Turning to the juvenile
court was by then the right thing to do. See supra notes 113–22 and accompanying text. That
the court had to engage in extraordinary contortions to establish its jurisdiction illustrates this
point particularly well.

COLEMAN.35.4 (Do Not Delete)

1318

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

4/10/2014 2:22 PM

[Vol. 35:1289

any event, concerned about the welfare of his patient but bound by the
hospital’s decision to proceed only if “specific court approval of the
harvesting procedures” was obtained in advance, 144 J.C.’s “surgeon was
seeking his own advice on the matter from a long-term acquaintance
and judge in Louisiana, whose opinion was that, with [J.C.]’s life at risk,
no court would hold against the parents’ wishes and the physician’s
recommendation for the harvesting procedures.”145
The conflicting legal opinions obtained by the hospital’s lawyers
and J.C.’s surgeon likely reflected the parties’ different orientations to
the problem: The lawyers and their client, the hospital’s administration,
were concerned about liability, and as with most hospital counsels, they
were likely risk-averse; thus, they were properly focused on the
applicable law which included not only traditional battery and consent
doctrines but also child abuse rules since parents cannot provide lawful
consent to batteries that transcend abuse standards. 146 The surgeon and
his clients, J.C. and her parents, were concerned about the medical
promise afforded by the transplants; thus, they were focused on
ensuring they could somehow make the law work for them. 147
The problem was that the governing law was no longer friendly to
petitioners in pediatric sibling transplant cases. Citing the 1969
Kentucky state court’s decision in Strunk and the 1972 Connecticut
court’s decision in Hart, Professor Tilden argues that a judge “could
have found subject matter jurisdiction in the inherent powers of a court
of equity, as other courts have done.” 148 But this is wrong: These
inherent powers had long since been abrogated by legislatures both in
statutes carefully delineating the terms under which the courts’
remaining equity jurisdiction could be exercised, and in other legislation
that mapped in increasing detail the state law boundaries of parental
Tilden, supra note 1, at 95.
Id. at 97. Tilden describes J.C.’s surgeon as being “frustrated” by “the hospital’s legal
approach,” which “prompt[ed] him to recommend to the parents that they retain their own
counsel. . . . [T]he surgeon felt that the hospital was more concerned with the potential longterm liability from performance of the procedures than with the pressing needs of a severely
burned child.” Id. Of course, long-term legal liability would attach if the procedures were
performed in contravention of the state’s battery and related maltreatment laws (and the
healthy child’s rights under those laws), and thus one could view the hospital’s trepidation as
rights protective.
146 See Coleman, supra note 12, at 545–59 (describing the boundaries of parents’ medical
consent authority). Notably, modern abuse standards do not allow for consideration of parental
motivation except in the context of reasonable corporal punishment and medical treatment for
the child herself. See supra note 119; infra notes 193–97.
147 I do not assume that the surgeon had no thoughts about S.C. Rather, I assume that, as he
told the court, because the risks inherent in the medical aspects of the procedures were
negligible in relation to the enormous benefits that would inure to J.C.—either life or
significantly ameliorated physical aesthetics—he believed it made sense to focus on J.C. Of
course, it was also his fiduciary obligation to his patient to be so focused.
148 Tilden, supra note 1, at 114 n.191.
144
145
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authority. The Texas court’s 1979 decision in Little had already provided
a sense of these new restrictions and the procedural moves that would
henceforth be required to come within the bounds of equity. 149 In
Alabama, the applicable statute in 2003 was again the probate code, 150
but unlike the Texas code, this version contained an important (and
apparently immutable) legal obstacle: It was explicit that children who
have parents “with custodial rights” could not be the subject of the
court’s probate jurisdiction; 151 indeed, the purpose of the relevant
provisions was to facilitate the appointment of guardians for children
whose parents were unavailable because of incapacity, relinquishment,
abandonment, or death. 152 S.C. and J.C.’s parents were alive and well,
and their physical and legal custody of their children was not in doubt—
they were a “normal” intact family in these respects. Thus, although the
surgeon’s judicial acquaintance in Louisiana may have been correct to
tell him that with a child’s life in the balance, “no court would hold
against the parents’ wishes and the physician’s recommendation for the
harvesting procedures,” 153 the matter of figuring out how legally to
accomplish this result remained a serious one. Indeed, a routine analysis
of the relevant provisions would suggest that for the girls’ parents, the
door to probate and thus to equity was sealed shut.
What appears to have happened next is thus truly extraordinary: 154
The parents filed a petition in probate court on Thursday, January 2,
2003, alleging jurisdiction under the probate code; describing the code’s
remaining equity powers and suggesting that these permitted the court
to “‘stretch forth its arm in whatever direction its aid . . . may be
149 See supra notes 129–39 and accompanying text (discussing the procedural wrangling in
that case).
150 ALA. CODE § 26-2A-31 cmt. (1975) (“The ‘court’ referred to in this section is the probate
court.”).
151 The statute initially defines the jurisdiction of the state’s probate courts broadly to
include “all subject matter relating to estates of protected persons and protection of minors and
incapacitated persons.” Id. § 26-2A-31(a). However, the official comment associated with this
section is explicit that “[t]he subject matter jurisdiction described in this section affects the
jurisdiction of the probate court only insofar as it applies to proceedings under this chapter and
it does not purport to otherwise expand the jurisdiction of probate courts as established in other
law.” Id. § 26-2A-31 cmt. (emphasis added). The only proceedings that relate to the protection
of minors who are not also “incapacitated” are guardianship proceedings, and those provisions
are clear that they do not apply to children whose parents have custodial rights. See id. § 26-2A73(a) (“The court may appoint a guardian for an unmarried minor if all parental rights have
been terminated or suspended by circumstances or prior order of a court having
jurisdiction . . . .”); id. § 26-2A-73 cmt. (“The court is not authorized to appoint a guardian for
one for whom a parent has custodial rights . . . .)”).
152 See ALA. CODE § 26-2A-73 cmt. (discussing these circumstances generally).
153 Tilden, supra note 1, at 97.
154 Given the limitations inherent in the probate code, it is my opinion that this explanation
of the case’s procedural history is the only way to understand the court’s assumption of
jurisdiction. It can be pieced together from a careful review of the filings, the court’s order, and
the relevant provisions of the code. It is also discussed in Tilden, supra note 1, at 113–15.
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needed;’” and arguing that in this instance its aid was needed to
authorize them to consent to the skin harvesting procedures because it
was in S.C.’s best interests to support J.C. 155 Four days later, on Monday,
January 6, the court determined that the conflict of interest faced by the
parents—having to choose between their burned daughter’s life and/or
circumstances and their healthy daughter’s welfare and physical
integrity—made it impossible for them to be proper parents to and to
make decisions in the best interests of either daughter, and thus, the
girls effectively had no “parents.” 156 This first determination unsealed
the door to probate. The next step was to appoint “guardians” for the
girls who could act and make decisions in their best interests. 157 In a
second, but this time truly inexplicable contortion, the court on the
same day, January 6, named as “guardians” these very same individuals
who had just been declared incapable of conflict-free, best interests
decisionmaking. 158 Thus, the girls whose parents were unavailable to the
point that they could be said to have no “parents” had their parents as
“guardians.” The papers contain no discussion of how this
transformation in name managed also to restore their on-the-ground
fiduciary capacities.
Presumably, concern over the parents’ actual (as opposed to legal)
capacities was never the point. The Verified Petition makes clear that
they were purposeful and directed throughout the legal proceedings,
and that their goal—to get legally effective signatures on the hospital’s
consent forms so that they could proceed with the transplant—would be
accomplished however they had to describe themselves in the process.
Indeed, S.C.’s GAL characterized them as being “hugely in favor” of the
harvesting the day after the petition was filed, which he found to be
“understandable by anyone” given that they had been told that it would
result in a “substantial mortality reduction for J.C.” 159 The fact that the
court made them guardians on the same day it declared them to be too
conflicted to function as parents also makes clear that it never doubted
their capacities, notwithstanding that finding otherwise was necessary to
establishing its jurisdiction.
The substantive aspects of the case are not nearly so tricky although
they are notable. The petition for declaratory judgment filed by the girls’
parents acting in their capacity as guardians alleged that:

155 Verified Petition, supra note 2, at 1–2, 4 (citing Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386, 387 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1972)).
156 Tilden, supra note 1, at 114.
157 Letters of Guardianship, In re S.C., No. 180564 (Ala. Prob. Ct. Jan. 6, 2003) (on file with
author).
158 Tilden, supra note 1, at 114.
159 Guardian ad Litem Report, supra note 3, at 2.
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S.C., [J.C.]’s identical twin sister, is the best available source of skin
for the skin grafting procedures necessary to save [J.C.]’s life. . . . [A]
successful graft from [S.C.] would reduce the probability of [J.C.]
dying from her wounds and attendant complications (i.e. infection)
from approximately sixty percent (60%) to approximately ten
percent (10%). . . . [J.C.’s surgeon] is of the opinion that the
harvesting of the necessary skin from [S.C.] presents minimal risk to
S.C. as the donor and is the last best hope for establishing permanent
skin covering on [J.C.]’s wounds. 160

The petition cited as precedents Hart, Strunk, and Little, which together
reflect all of the possible legal approaches to authorizing the parents to
proceed—namely that it is in the source’s psychological best interests,
that the harms and risks to the source are outweighed by the benefits to
the recipient, and that it is within parents’ rights and responsibilities to
make decisions for their children. 161 Finally, the petition requested that
the court find that “serving as a donor and undergoing the said
procedures is in the best interest of the minor child, [S.C.]”162
GALs were appointed to represent the two girls on Friday, January
3. 163 S.C.’s GAL performed his adversarial role admirably. 164 He spent
most of that day with J.C.’s GAL at the hospital meeting separately with
the surgeons, the girls, their parents, a clinical psychologist on staff at
the hospital, and a pediatrician who was also the medical director. 165 His
report to the court was drafted in the period between when he left the
hospital on Friday afternoon and when he filed it with the court on
Monday morning, January 6. It notes “[f]or the record” that he “does
not contest the right or authority of th[e] court to issue . . . an order” in
the case, suggesting that he may have been aware of but decided not to
engage the jurisdictional controversy; it sets out the fact that he
“strongly contest[ed] and oppose[d] the order . . . as not being in the
best interest and welfare of the ‘well child’, [S.C.]”; and it distinguishes
the three precedents cited by her parents on the grounds that two
(Strunk and Little) involved true incompetents, not children, and the
one that did involve a child (Hart) was not comparable because unlike
kidney harvesting, “skin grafting surgery . . . has vastly different longterm implications with physical body disfigurement or discoloration
Verified Petition, supra note 2, at 3.
Id. at 4.
162 Id. at 5.
163 See Appointment of Guardian ad Litem in the Matter of a Minor, In re S.C., Nos. 180564
& 180565 (Ala. Prob. Ct. Jan. 6, 2003) (on file with author).
164 Although the court rejected the GAL’s analysis and conclusion, its order notes
specifically that the GALs both exhibited “outstanding due diligence” and that S.C.’s GAL in
particular was to be commended for his “specific opposition to [the] petition.” Order on
Petition, supra note 7, at 2.
165 See Guardian ad Litem Report, supra note 3, at 1.
160
161
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damage that is open and visible for all to observe as well as probable
psychological damage to the minor ‘well child’, both in her childhood
and as an adult.” 166 The GAL focused on this last point over two-and-ahalf single-spaced typed pages of his report, which included the
following submissions:
It is proposed that [the same doctor] would be the surgeon for [S.C.],
the minor donor and also for [J.C.], the minor donee. With all due
respect to [this doctor], who seems to be totally committed to saving
[J.C.]’s life, it is this GAL’s opinion that [he] has a direct conflict and
cannot simultaneously serve in dual capacities representing that he is
looking out for the best interest of [J.C.] and at the same time,
looking out for the best interest of [S.C.]. This GAL submits . . . that
if the “well child” had a separate surgeon, [she] . . . could not in all
good conscience, verbalize that the proposed 2 or 3 skin removal
surgeries on [S.C.] would be or even could be in her best interest.
How could that happen when the short term effect on [S.C.] would
be pretty severe pain and more importantly, the long term damage
would be physical body permanent damage to the surgical areas that
would have far-reaching psychological damage, both in childhood
and even into adulthood—creating probable lifelong emotional
issues including self-esteem issues, feeling different or less than
because of the physical damage and barriers to intimacy with
others. 167

The GAL did take J.C.’s injuries into account, but he was not willing to
accept that they outweighed the harms and risks to S.C. simply because,
as he understood the medical facts, “there [were] other reasonable
options available” to J.C.’s parents that “d[id] not impose life-long
physical and emotional scars to [S.C.].” 168 He concluded that “the relief
sought . . . is not equitable under the given circumstances.”169
Nevertheless, on the same day the GAL submitted his report, the court
signed an order permitting S.C.’s use as a skin source for her sister that
was in its relevant parts a verbatim transcription of the parents’ original
petition. 170

Id. at 2.
Id. at 2–3. Others have noted the ethical issues implicated by having the same transplant
surgeon or team work with the two children. See, e.g., AAP Policy Statement, supra note 32, at
398.
168 See Guardian ad Litem Report, supra note 3, at 4. Professor Tilden’s evaluation is
consistent with this conclusion. See Tilden, supra note 1, at 87–88, 107–09 (suggesting that in
all likelihood the transplants from S.C. were ultimately designed to alleviate J.C.’s significant
remaining pain and ameliorate her physical appearance).
169 See Guardian ad Litem Report, supra note 3, at 4.
170 See Order on Petition, supra note 7, at 2–3.
166
167
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The Law on the Ground Today

This last Alabama decision and the five other cases I have described
here are the only ones I could find records for that authorized pediatric
sibling transplants in the period from 1957 to 2013. 171 But we know that
those are not the only cases since pediatric sibling transplants seem to be
a medical commonplace. 172 Indeed, given hospitals’ traditionally riskaverse approach to potential liability, it is reasonable to assume both
that judges around the country have and continue to be asked for
authorization to proceed with pediatric sibling transplants and that,
consistent with the view of J.C.’s surgeon’s judicial acquaintance from
Louisiana, they have found ways to get around the legal obstacles in
their jurisdictions. It is also reasonable to assume that judges in areas
around major transplant centers proceed apace, either in reliance on old
equity cases—mindlessly or willfully ignoring their irrelevance in the
present period—or assuming without more that the law does not oppose
authorizations so long as the procedural Is are dotted and Ts are
crossed. Finally, it is reasonable to assume based on years of pro forma
judicial proceedings that at least some hospital counsels or transplant
teams are comfortable proceeding in the absence of judicial
authorization: Where there is no one to complain about the transplant,
it may be done as other surgeries are, within the auspices of medical
privacy. This last scenario is perhaps most likely to be true with bone
marrow transplants which are relatively noncontroversial in the current
period despite their factual invasiveness. 173

171 There are related cases with available decisions. See Howard v. Fulton DeKalb Hosp.
Auth., 42 U.S.L.W. 2322 (Ga. Super. Ct. 1973) (decision on file with author) (authorizing
kidney donation by fifteen-year-old mentally retarded girl to her mother); Curran v. Bosze, 566
N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990) (denying father authority to require, against their mother’s wishes, his
twins to submit to bone marrow compatibility testing and harvesting procedure for the benefit
of their half-brother); In re Richardson, 284 So. 2d 185 (La. Ct. App. 1973) (denying parent
authority to consent to kidney donation by seventeen-year-old mentally retarded boy to his
sister). Other commentators have written about these cases and their work contains additional
references. See supra note 31.
172 See supra notes 34, 79–80, 124–28 and accompanying text (describing existing data on
point); infra notes 174–80 and accompanying text (summarizing the position of the American
Academy of Pediatrics on the practice). Especially within the medical community the practice
seems to be an accepted fact and what is written about it is not whether it happens but rather
how to proceed legally, ethically, and otherwise. See, e.g., AAP Policy Statement, supra note 32,
at 393–94 (first describing the existence and history of the practice and then noting that “[m]ost
pediatric physicians who perform transplants believe it is acceptable to expose minors to the
risks of a stem cell donation when that donation offers a substantial prospect of benefit to a
close family member and when proper consent is obtained”); Pentz et al., supra note 32, at 149
(describing studies of minor bone marrow donors conducted post-harvesting); Pristave &
Watson, supra note 31, passim (advising physicians about how to proceed with pediatric kidney
harvesting within the bounds of the law).
173 AAP Policy Statement, supra note 32, at 392; infra note 199.
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In what may be the most persuasive evidence of the existence of
this practice on the ground, the Committee on Bioethics of the
American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) in 2008 and 2010 for the first
time took the public position that it is ethical to use a healthy minor
child as an organ source so long as certain conditions are met; 174 its 2008
statement concerned solid organs 175 and its 2010 statement concerned
hematopoietic stem cells including bone marrow. 176 In the context of its
ethical analysis of stem cell harvesting, the Committee noted its view
that it is a “fact that authorization of a stem cell donation by a minor is
within the proper realm of parental decisionmaking” and suggested that
such “donations” may take place simply based on this parental right—
that is, without judicial review. 177 Specifically, the Committee took the
position that “legal precedent for stem cell donation by incompetent
adults and children is firmly established, [and thus that] as a general
matter, donation by a minor should not require court review or
approval.” 178 It took essentially the same position with respect to the
harvesting of solid organs. 179 Finally, without any apparent sense of the
law on the books or of the complicated legal history of pediatric sibling
transplants—neither of which relates primarily to GALs—it opined that
“[h]istorically, the primary value of the judicial review process was to
ensure an independent advocate for the incompetent potential
donor.” 180
174 AAP Policy Statement, supra note 32, at 396. As I discuss in Part III, these conditions—
which largely mirror those proposed in 1993 by the American Medical Association’s Council on
Ethical and Judicial Affairs—are very well-considered and ought to be guideposts as the law
develops its own standards in this area.
175 AAP Clinical Report, supra note 34.
176 AAP Policy Statement, supra note 32.
177 Id. at 396.
178 Id. at 400.
179 AAP Clinical Report, supra note 34, at 459 (“Given that legal precedent for living organ
donations by incompetent adults and children is firmly established, the AAP does not believe
that every donation by a minor should require court approval.”).
180 AAP Policy Statement, supra note 32, at 400. What is especially curious about the AAP’s
position is that it considers judicial oversight to be unnecessary in circumstances where the
hospital has a “donor advocate” on the view that this advocate satisfies the concerns that begged
the presence of a GAL in court. Id. This is incorrect for two reasons. First, as the cases described
in this section make clear, judicial review is primarily intended to test parental authority, which
is a legal question separate from (albeit informed by) the factual question of the healthy child’s
interests. Second, according to the AAP’s own description, the model donor advocate does not
and is not intended to play the same role as the GAL. The GAL’s role was specifically designed
to be adversarial, to assure that someone with authority developed and presented the argument
against using the healthy child as an organ source as a way to keep the adults in the case honest.
See Baron et al., supra note 78, at 171. The work done by the GALs in Farinelli and In re S.C.
exemplify this intended role. In contrast, the AAP’s model donor advocate is not expected to
“judge . . . reasonable decisions being made by parents in an intimate family” but rather to
“support,” “supplement,” and be “an ally” to parents who are otherwise preoccupied by their ill
child’s circumstances; like the policy itself, the advocate is “meant to be quite deferential to
parental authority.” Ross, supra note 32, at 520. What this means is that in places where the
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This is actually the state of the law: As of this writing, two states
(Alabama and Wisconsin) by statute authorize the use of healthy minor
children as stem cell (but not other organ) donors, and one state
(Michigan) by statute allows a mature minor to consent to donate a
kidney (but not other organs), on the condition that the consent is
approved by a court ex ante. 181 Also as of this writing, there is only one
published decision ever to take the position that a healthy minor child
can be used as any kind of organ source (Hart); 182 notably, this decision
is not only old but also out of a lower state court (in Connecticut) and
thus is not binding “precedent” there or anywhere else. There are only a
few other available decisions on point (Masden, Foster, Huskey, and
Farinelli out of Massachusetts and In re S.C. out of Alabama), but they
are unpublished and thus are not binding “precedent” even in their own
jurisdictions. Most importantly, as I have described throughout this
Part, none of these decisions stands on anything firmer than quicksand
in terms of their formal jurisdictional or precedential value: At the risk
of minimizing the complexities at issue, for this purpose equity
jurisdiction is essentially dead and neither Brown v. Board of Education
nor Strunk v. Strunk can honestly support a modern claim for authority
in this setting. On the other hand, although this was not always the case,
it is quite clear today that parental rights and authority are constrained
by the law in all jurisdictions that non-accidental physical harm to a
child is prohibited; there are exceptions, most notably for treatment and
for corporal punishment, but neither saving or ameliorating the life of a
sibling nor the psychological benefits that might inure to a donor child
are among them. It is thus difficult to understand the basis for the
AAP’s view that “legal precedent for . . . donation by . . . children is

AAP policy is implemented, not only is there no ex ante judicial review of the decision to
proceed with the use of a child as an organ source, but there is also no one whose role it is to
put proponents of the surgery to the test, to ensure that the decision in every case takes into
account the separate interests of the healthy child and not only the medical emergency and
attendant possibilities. The purpose of the adversarial process is to ensure that the ultimate
decisionmaker has all of the facts, is aware of all of the arguments, and thus is most likely to
arrive at the best result. See, e.g., Robert Gilbert Johnston & Sara Lufrano, The Adversary System
as a Means of Seeking Truth and Justice, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 147, 147 (2002). Although the
protocols associated with donor advocates suggest the criteria to be followed, some of which
mirror what a GAL would consider, the protocols are insufficient in comparison with an
adversarial process enforced by the courts because they are merely best practices, not
mandatory, and because as written they tilt toward permitting the harvesting. See Ross, supra
note 32, at 520 (“The donor advocate serves as an ally to both the donor child and his or her
family, and is only empowered to prevent sibling donations in very rare circumstances.”).
181 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.5105 (West 2014); see also ALA. CODE § 22-8-9 (1975);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 146.34 (West 2014).
182 Recall that Little, the only other published decision involving a minor, was based on the
premise that the child was an “incompetent” and thus not subject to the usual rules governing
children. See supra notes 129–39 and accompanying text (discussing this case).
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firmly established” unless it is in the lived medical experience that the
law and judges are either infinitely malleable or else irrelevant.
II. EXPLAINING THE STATUS QUO
The legal history of pediatric sibling transplants is clear on two
points: First, formal law, the law “on the books,” has long been
uncomfortable authorizing the necessary harvesting procedures. This
discomfort has increased markedly in recent decades to the point where,
with some notable exceptions, it may be impossible today to obtain a
declaratory judgment lawfully authorizing the surgery; the fact that a
judge may provide it does not mean that it is legal. 183 Second, healthy
minor children continue to be used as organ sources for their ill siblings,
sometimes with the assistance of lawyers and judges. The medical
possibilities and the ethical norms of the medical profession (rather than
law) appear to govern outcomes “on the ground.” This second part of
the Article explores the reasons for the law’s discomfort with pediatric
sibling transplants and the weighty countervailing interests that explain
their persistence, and it evaluates the normative and practical
implications of this status quo.
A.

The Law’s Discomfort with Pediatric Sibling Transplants

That the law is and has long been uncomfortable with pediatric
sibling transplants is evident in its treatment of the practice beginning
with the first recorded case in 1957 through the last available decision in
2003. In that forty-six year period, courts that have been asked to
authorize the use of healthy minor children as organ sources for their ill
and injured siblings have mostly struggled to establish the substantive
basis for authorizing the nontherapeutic procedures in general and then
to identify the appropriate standard for making decisions in individual
cases. Most recently, they have struggled as a threshold matter even to
obtain jurisdiction over the parties.
The reasons for this discomfort and the legal hurdles that result are
clear and noncontroversial—at least within the discipline. United States
183 An act which is “beyond powers conferred . . . by law” is ultra vires. BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1522 (6th ed. 1990). Governmental (including judicial) as well as private actors
may be found to have acted ultra vires and thus to have their associated acts themselves
declared null and void. See, e.g., Summit Media LLC v. City of Los Angeles, 150 Cal. Rptr. 3d
574, 584 (Ct. App. 2012) (judge acting ultra vires); Hopewell Valley Citizens’ Grp., Inc. v.
Berwind Prop. Grp. Dev. Co., 10 A.3d 211, 221–22 (N.J. 2011) (dissenting Justice explaining
position that composition of court was unconstitutional and thus that “its acts are ultra vires”);
ZYZY Corp. v. Hernandez, 345 S.W.3d 452, 459 (Tex. App. 2011) (same).
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law is based in classical liberal theory and is thus fundamentally
committed to the protection of individual rights. Among these rights,
the law has long held that bodily integrity and decisional autonomy—
including particularly as autonomy relates to bodily integrity—are of
paramount importance. 184 The tort of battery and the doctrine of
informed consent operationalize these rights by providing individuals
with a cause of action against anyone who would seek to violate them.
As Professor Dan Dobbs explains in his treatise on torts,
[t]he central core of the battery rules is simple. Subject only to the
most limited exception, the defendant must respect the plaintiff’s
apparent wishes to avoid intentional bodily contact. Hostile,
aggressive, or harmful touchings are batteries because the plaintiff
wishes to avoid them. But the plaintiff’s right to avoid unwanted
intentional contact does not depend upon the defendant’s hostile
intent or even upon the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s wishes. A
person is entitled to refuse well-intentioned medical treatment as
well as the bumptious grapplings of an unwelcome swain. In a world
full of uncontrollable events, all persons are at least entitled to
prohibit unwanted intentional touchings of any kind. 185

Thus, as the Supreme Court of Illinois explained in Curran v. Bosze, a
decision denying a non-custodial father the right even to have his
children tested for compatibility with their half-brother who was dying
of leukemia, “‘[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of [the individual’s] own person, free from all
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable
authority of law.’” 186 This quoted language is from an 1891 decision of
the United States Supreme Court.
Of course because children need adults to take care of them
physically, and because children lack the legal if not also the cognitive
capacity to consent, these first principles apply differently to their
circumstances. But this does not mean that the law denies children’s
right to bodily integrity. 187 Indeed, although this was not always the
184 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994) (“The protections of substantive due process
have for the most part been accorded to matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and
the right to bodily integrity.”); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966) (“The integrity
of an individual’s person is a cherished value of our society.”); David G. Owen, Philosophical
Foundations of Fault in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 201, 217–18
(David G. Owen ed., 1995) (“[B]odily integrity interest is accorded a higher abstract value than
property and economic interests [and] has a long and deep tradition in the law of torts.”
(footnote omitted)).
185 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 54–55 (2000) (footnotes omitted).
186 Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319, 1323 (Ill. 1990) (alteration in original) (quoting Union
Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
187 See, e.g., Rhonda Gay Hartman, Noblesse Oblige: States’ Obligations to Minors Living with
Life-Limiting Conditions, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 333, 362 (2012) (“Although children and adolescents
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case, today a parent’s rights to touch her child physically and to give
proxy consent for others to do the same are formally linked to her
responsibility to do so in the child’s individual best interests. In this
respect, modern law conceives of parents as fiduciaries.188 As one court
has explained,
the parental right to control a child’s nurture is grounded not in
any absolute property right which can be enforced to the detriment
of the child, but rather is akin to a trust, subject to . . . [a]
correlative duty to care for and protect the child,
and . . . [terminable] by [the parents’] failure to discharge their
obligations. 189
It takes a lot for the law to intervene in the parent-child
relationship on the basis that the parent has failed to discharge her
fiduciary obligations. Indeed, because the law presumes that fit parents
act in their children’s individual best interests, 190 unless there is a
sufficient charge and evidence to the contrary, most parental actions
and decisions—including those that are not actually in their child’s best
interests—are beyond review. 191 This presumption exists in part because
the law does not want to second-guess parents as they proceed
according to their often very different capacities and inclinations—in
other words, the law intends to establish a wide range of permissible
parenting and parental decisions. 192 However, it does have a few
categorical boundaries, and consistent with the law’s fealty to bodily
integrity most relate to the child’s physical welfare.
Of particular relevance to this Article, the law prohibits parents
and those to whom they would delegate parental authority from
intentionally causing or risking physical harm to a child. This
prohibition is ensconced in the tort law of battery and in civil and
criminal statutes prohibiting physical abuse; together, these laws create a
coherent system that protects the child from physical injuries that have

lack capacity for medical decision making by law, the value of personal dignity, including
bodily integrity and self-identity, applies to all persons. Personal dignity is not limited to those
having legal autonomy.”).
188 See supra notes 24–28; infra note 190 and accompanying text (elaborating on this idea).
189 Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1063 (Mass. 1978) (alterations in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
190 Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (“The law’s concept of the family rests on a
presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for
judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions. . . . [I]t has recognized that natural
bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.”).
191 See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304 (1993) (“So long as certain minimum requirements
of child care are met, the interests of the child may be subordinated to the interests of other
children, or indeed even to the interests of the parents . . . themselves.”).
192 See supra notes 9–13 and accompanying text (discussing this political and legal
principle).
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not been established as being in her individual best interests. Thus,
although parents were historically immune from tort liability for the
harms they inflicted on their children, “[w]here the parent is guilty of an
intentional [as opposed to negligence] tort, the courts [today] agree that
the immunity is no defense.” 193 Only batteries justified by discipline194
and treatment 195 continue to be privileged. Similarly, where a parent’s
good faith (or lack of maliciousness) used to preclude state intervention
in the family under the civil maltreatment laws and punishment under
the analogous criminal provisions, today unless treatment or reasonable
corporal punishment is at issue, parental motivation is irrelevant.
Specifically to the point of the pediatric sibling transplant cases, neither
the needs of a severely ill or injured brother or sister nor a psychological
benefit to the child herself are sufficient to justify a parent’s or delegate’s
intentional invasion of the child’s bodily integrity. 196 As the Maryland
Court of Appeals (the supreme court of that state) emphasized in an
analogous context, the parent of a healthy child “cannot consent to the
participation of [that] child . . . in nontherapeutic research or studies in
which there is any risk of injury or damage to the health of the
subject.”197
As a doctrinal matter, cutting or piercing a child’s skin, flesh, and
(depending on the kind of transplant) bone to the point necessary to
remove an organ inevitably satisfies battery law’s definition of a
193 DOBBS, supra note 185, at 756; see also id. at 753–54 (describing the old rule that “parents
and those in loco parentis could not be held liable for either intentional or negligent torts to
their minor, unemancipated children,” the erosion of that rule, and that today
“[c]ourts . . . allow[] recovery for intentional or willful torts, [even] where the immunity
otherwise remains” (footnote omitted)).
194 Id. at 754.
195 See supra notes 39, 133–34 and accompanying text.
196 Apart from the law’s allowance for reasonable corporal punishment (which pre-dates all
modern restrictions on parental authority) and the pediatric sibling transplant cases, there is
only one state court decision arguably authorizing surgery on the basis that this was in the
child’s psychological and developmental best interests. See In re Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641,
675–76 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1970) (holding that a mother who had consented to plastic surgery on
her son’s face, but who refused to consent to the blood transfusions necessary to the operation’s
success and the child’s survival, was guilty of child neglect), aff’d per curiam, 278 N.E.2d 918
(N.Y. 1972). As I have written elsewhere,

[t]he surgery itself was deemed necessary to cure the child’s apparently substantial
cosmetic deformity so that he would have a chance to lead a more-or-less normal
life. . . . Everyone’s interest at the time of the litigation was to fix his face so that this
damage could be at least partially undone.
Coleman, supra note 12, at 553 n.146. Sampson is an isolated case both because it has not been
followed, and because it is otherwise idiosyncratic. It certainly cannot be relied upon for the
proposition that “the law” permits surgery to benefit the child psychologically or
developmentally.
197 Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807, 858 (Md. 2001). For a detailed discussion
of the Grimes case and in particular of the occasional collision between law and legal norms on
the one hand, and science and medicine and their norms on the other, see Coleman, supra note
12, at 578–90.
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“harmful or intentional bodily contact” 198 and civil and criminal
maltreatment laws’ definitions of “physical harm,” even where these are
conditioned by the requirement of “seriousness.” 199 Thus, although the
medical and bioethics literatures tend to ignore this threshold point to
focus on the short- and long-term consequences (risks) of surgery
including on the associated pain, 200 for the law the bodily injury that is
the surgery itself is central. Some if not all organ harvesting procedures
may also fail those parts of the maltreatment definitions that are
separately concerned with risk, but this is secondary. 201 What this means
is that the bodily injuries that are a necessary part of pediatric sibling
transplants are only lawful if they fit within an exception to the
prohibition against intentional physical harm. To the extent that
discipline and treatment are the only two “clear and unquestionable”
privileges in this area, and that the law requires such “authority,” 202 the
answer is negative. 203
The arguments that have garnered support in the line of pediatric
sibling transplant cases discussed in Part I and in the medical, legal, and
bioethics literatures 204 simply do not work to bring pediatric sibling
transplants within the range of legally permissible harms that might be
inflicted on healthy children by their parents and their parents’
delegates: Contrary to the sentiments expressed in Farinelli, Hart, and
See DOBBS, supra note 185, at 54.
Coleman et al., supra note 119, at 114–17 (detailing the states’ definitions of physical
abuse). All transplants involve subjecting the healthy child to surgery. Even the most minimally
invasive and least risky organ donation surgeries—bone marrow and stem cell retrieval—
typically require the pediatric donor to undergo general anesthesia and tissue cutting and
removal. See, e.g., The Bone Marrow Harvest Procedure: What Happens After the Procedure?,
CLEVELAND CLINIC, http://my.clevelandclinic.org/services/Bone_Marrow_Transplantation/
hic_The_Bone_Marrow_Harvest_Procedure.aspx (last visited Mar. 19, 2014). Laparoscopic
nephrectomy, the least invasive, least risky kidney harvesting procedure, is similarly serious;
that is, after administering general anesthesia,
198
199

[y]our surgeon will make 3 or 4 small cuts, usually no more than 1-inch each, in your
belly and side. The surgeon will use tiny probes and a camera to do the surgery.
Towards the end of the procedure, your doctor will make one of the cuts larger
(around 4 inches) to take out the kidney. The surgeon will cut the ureter, place a bag
around the kidney, and pull it through the larger cut.
Kidney Removal, N.Y. TIMES HEALTH GUIDE, http://health.nytimes.com/health/guides/surgery/
kidney-removal/overview (last visited Mar. 19, 2014) (citing Andrew C. Novick, Open Surgery
of the Kidney, in CAMPBELL-WALSH UROLOGY (Alan J. Wein et al. eds., 9th ed. 2007)).
Traditional kidney harvesting procedures (simple and radical nephrectomies) and other organ
retrieval surgeries involve more invasive, and thus commensurately more serious, measures. See
id.
200 Coleman, supra note 12, at 560–61.
201 Coleman et al., supra note 119, at 110, 114–15.
202 See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
203 Creative advocates may argue that being an organ source is “treatment” and that being
required to be altruistic is “discipline.” Given the stingy state of the law in this area, neither of
these efforts has been or is likely to be successful.
204 See supra Part I (describing these arguments); infra Part III (same).
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In re S.C., parents do not have the responsibility and thus the right to
decide to use one child as an organ source for another; by the terms of
tort and maltreatment law (which largely describe the terms of related
constitutional doctrine) this decision is outside the boundaries of their
consent authority. Contrary to the position taken in the Massachusetts
transplant trilogy, in Little, and in In re S.C., the healthy child’s
psychological best interests cannot justify the physical harms and risks
inherent in the harvesting surgery; the law is simply not designed to
permit the elevation of the former over the latter. And most especially,
contrary to the notion that was said to dictate the outcome in Farinelli
and Hart, intentional physical harm to one child cannot be justified on
the grounds that, on balance, the reallocation of organs within the
family is in its best interests; it is no surprise that this approach was
ultimately unsuccessful even within the otherwise renegade line of cases
that are the sibling transplant decisions205 since it violates one of the
most important principles of American law: That the individual be the
basis for decision as to matters that concern especially her physical
welfare.
As the remainder of this Article suggests, this legal landscape is not
beyond criticism. It does, however, explain the basis for the law’s
longstanding discomfort with pediatric sibling transplants. Although the
transplants may be justified by more holistic takes on personal integrity
or by other-than-liberal social norms, they are impossible to reconcile
with modern legal doctrine.
B.

The Persistence of Pediatric Sibling Transplants Despite the Law

The conundrum posed by pediatric sibling transplants is that they
persist notwithstanding clear doctrine to the contrary and that mostly
no one seems to intervene, including the legal actors who are
responsible for administering the states’ tort and maltreatment
definitions on the ground. The reasons for their willingness in particular
to transgress the boundaries of their own authority—to act ultra vires
and to bear the professional risks of that move—may be as simple as the
unbearable plight of a dying child, the basic human instinct to save her,
and the inevitable demotion or overwhelming of other weighty
concerns. No one wants to have had the power to rescue the child and to
have been the reason she died. With respect to those other weighty
concerns, the most important is the welfare of the healthy child who
would be the organ source. As to him, it has to be that his interests can
205 As far as I can tell, no other pediatric sibling transplant decision took this position; the
decisions that followed Hart and Farinelli all reverted (at least formally) to a “best interests of
the [healthy] child” analysis. See supra Part I (describing the line of available cases).
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be demoted and overwhelmed because he is understood—at least in the
moment and in contrast with comparable adults—not to be a full bearer
of individual rights. But of course these explanations about instinct and
expediency cannot be the basis for principled decisionmaking in law or
in ethics. Thus, the cases and the literature suggest some better
alternatives.
The view that parents ought to be able to remove organs from
healthy children to benefit their ill or injured siblings has been explained
on the basis of two related ideas. The first is that intra-family interests
balancing is an appropriate alternative to best interests analysis in cases
where the premise of fiduciary theory fails; that is, where there is more
than one child in the equation. This explanation appears to be a claim
within the law—it suggests that existing rules are insufficient for or
inapplicable to the special facts of pediatric sibling transplant cases and
then proposes an approach to address that vacuum. In contrast, the
second explanation is very much a claim outside of the law—essentially
it is that “the law is an ass” because the parent-child relationship is
better theorized as existing within a family unit made up of
interdependent members than within liberalism’s collective of
individuals.
The first claim, that fiduciary theory and the “best interests” test
are irrelevant in circumstances involving two or more children whose
interests are diverse, is based on the practical point that in these
circumstances it is impossible to act in the best interests of each child,
and thus parents have no choice but to make a decision; they cannot
simply abdicate their responsibility to decide. 206 Moreover, it makes
sense to allow them to make decisions based on an evaluation of the
situation as a whole, including by balancing the interests of the two (or
more) children at issue. 207
206 No one has yet developed this point. However, it has been noted in the family and
children’s law literature that fiduciary theory and the best interests test contemplate a parentchild dyad, where the only conflict of interest that might arise is a conflict between the parent’s
interests and those of the child. See, e.g., ALLEN E. BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING
FOR OTHERS: THE ETHICS OF SURROGATE DECISION MAKING 236 (1989) (“The case for
legitimate departures from the best interest[s] principle as a guidance principle in decision
making for children depends exclusively upon the fact that optimizing for the sick child may
conflict with the legitimate interests of other individuals within the family.”); Loken, supra note
24, at 1140–44 (elaborating on “[t]he difficulty of fulfilling parental duties for more than one
child” and the implications of this problem for the best interests standard, and suggesting that
“parental neglect of the child’s welfare [may be] justified” in circumstances where doing “‘good’
embraces all others, or even just the family unit (including siblings with their own needs)”).
207 Michael T. Morley, Note, Proxy Consent to Organ Donation by Incompetents, 111 YALE
L.J. 1215, 1243 (2002) (“Many important decisions are normally made based on the best
interests of the family—children take on after-school jobs, high school graduates forego
attending expensive institutions of higher learning, close friends and significant others are left
behind for a cross-country move. In poorer families, health care itself is rationed, and the cost
of visits to the doctor’s office is balanced against the needs of others in the family.”).
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This appears to have been the view of the courts that decided Hart,
Farinelli, and In re S.C., all three of which rejected the best interests
standard in lieu of an intra-child or intra-family balancing test. The
courts in Hart and Farinelli were explicit in their use of this alternative
approach. Thus, the question in Hart was not whether being a kidney
source was in the best interests of the healthy child but rather “whether
[the court] should abandon the donee to a brief medically complicated
life and eventual death or permit the natural parents to take some action
based on reason and medical probability in order to keep both children
alive.” 208 And to resolve this question the court “balanc[ed] . . . the rights
of the natural parents . . . . to keep both children alive” against “the
rights of the donor child.” 209 Similarly, the question in Farinelli was
“whether the parents’ decision [to use their daughter as a bone marrow
source
for
their
son] . . . is
fair
and
reasonable
in
210
the . . . circumstances,” and the answer was had by “weigh[ing] and
balanc[ing] the individual interests of the two children.” 211 The Farinelli
court also noted that “it will be a source of comfort, satisfaction and
psychological benefit to the parents to know that a transplant is
performed for [their son] whose chances of survival without it are
dubious at best.” 212 In re S.C. was not explicitly based on intra-family
balancing—it purported to rest on a best interests (of the healthy child)
analysis. But in fact the parties and the court paid only lip service to
those interests. 213 The various decisions that ultimately led to the
transplant in that case—of the burned child’s surgeon to suggest the
procedure, of her parents to proceed according to his suggestion, of
their lawyer to pursue an extraordinary legal strategy to avoid the
proper jurisdiction of the juvenile court, and of the judge to ignore the
petition of the healthy child’s GAL and sign off on the entire
transaction—plainly rested on an erasure of the harms and a
minimization of the risks to the healthy child in relation to the harms
that the injured child had already suffered as a result of the fire that
caused her burns, and in relation to the risks of the transplant that
would partially heal them. It also plainly rested on the view that, in the
circumstances, the girls’ parents should have the right to re-allocate
resources within the family. 214
The intra-child or intra-family balancing approach has a lot of
intuitive appeal because it reflects how we typically operate, that is, how
Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386, 390 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972).
Id.
210 Nathan v. Farinelli, No. 74-87 Equity 11, slip op. 491, 501 (Mass. July 3, 1974) (on file
with author).
211 Id.
212 Id. at 493.
213 See supra notes 160–70 and accompanying text (detailing the process in In re S.C.).
214 Id.
208
209
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routine and reasonable decisions are made within the family. For
example, the child with a particular talent, illness, or deficiency will
often get more of the family’s resources than his sister who makes no
particular demands on those resources; and the child who runs into the
street or who falls into a river will generally command her parent’s full
attentions even though it means neglecting (in the colloquial rather than
legal sense of the term) her less immediately-needy brother. These are
things we do, and in general we do them because we believe that when
there is a choice to be made—perhaps particularly in an emergency
setting—it makes sense to make it based on what will do the most good
or where the need is most clear-cut.
The power of this explanation for the persistence of pediatric
sibling transplants is limited, however, by the fact that it reflects an
incomplete description of fiduciary theory and the best interests test,
and because it posits a lawless choice in this context. It is true that
discussions and applications of fiduciary theory and the best interests
test tend to contemplate a parent-child dyad where the only conflict of
interest that might arise is a conflict between the parent’s interests and
those of her child; in other words, fiduciary theory and the best interests
test have not been developed as tools to resolve conflicts of interest
within the family where there are multiple children with diverse
interests. 215 However, although this may be problematic if one looks at
these principles only in their aspirational form, their real world
application makes clear that they do contemplate such situations. That
is, fulfillment of the best interests of the child standard does not actually
“require[] selfless dedication to the ideal best interests of the
child. . . . [P]arents . . . have legitimate competing interests to balance
and reality-driven circumstances to contend with, and thus, inevitably
and lawfully will fall short of that ideal.” 216 At the same time, application
of these principles requires the drawing of an absolute line at the point
where intra-child or intra-family decisionmaking within this framework
results in child maltreatment. This means that parents actually have a lot
of leeway to make decisions that are favorable to one child and
detrimental to another, so long as the detriment does not transcend
these boundaries. 217
Relatedly, these principles tell us much more than simply how to
resolve conflicts between a parent and her child. They also tell us
something about how we should think about the child herself, and about
See supra notes 206–14 and accompanying text (discussing this flaw in fiduciary theory).
Coleman, supra note 12, at 617; see also BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 206, at 236
(noting that “even as a guidance principle, the best interest[s] principle is to serve only as a
regulative ideal, not as a strict and literal requirement, because parents’ obligations toward their
other children as well as their own legitimate self-interests can conflict with doing what
maximizes the child’s well-being, and sometimes may take precedence over it”).
217 See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303–04 (1993).
215
216
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the limits to parental decisionmaking and conduct that flow from that
concept. Specifically, they tell us that as parents contemplate their
choices, the child must be considered as a person in her own right,
including with respect to her bodily integrity. And the doctrine that
flows from this particular idea is emphatic that respecting the child’s
bodily integrity denies the parent the right to go so far as to cut (or
bruise or poison) her intentionally, unless it is for her own benefit. 218
Because of this, the argument that the decision whether to remove
a healthy child’s organ to benefit an ill child is just like other hard
decisions made in multi-child families is difficult to sustain. It sets up a
false choice between saving or ameliorating the life of one child and
removing the organ of another. A parent only has the right to save her
child’s life, and a court or a surgeon only has the right to help her, by
lawful means. So, while she may want (rationally and/or instinctively) to
do whatever is in her power to save her dying child, the fact is that she
cannot balance competing interests and, based on that analysis,
“choose” to use her adult child, her sister’s child, or a friend’s child to
accomplish her goal. If these are her only “choices,” she has no choices.
A similarly-motivated surgeon or judge who wants to use the ill child’s
parent’s organ is also stuck without options if the parent declines to
sacrifice her bodily integrity for this purpose; because the parent’s rights
to bodily integrity and to autonomous decisionmaking are absolute, a
“donation” from them cannot be compelled. In law at least—and here,
again, I speak of maltreatment law as it is used to establish the existing
boundaries of family privacy—the so-called “choice” to use her own
healthy minor child similarly does not exist.
Thus, although interests balancing may be persuasive as a
description of how ordinary decisions are made within the family, it
does not provide a basis for a parental right to make any number of
extraordinary decisions that are unlawful according to established
boundaries. Specifically, it does not provide a basis for the extraordinary
right, first set out in Hart and repeated in Farinelli, of a parent to
consider among her options removing an organ from her healthy child
to benefit an ill sibling. 219 Standing alone, it does not explain why
nontherapeutic organ removal is not prohibited, or how (in terms of our
norms and aspirations) we justify expanding the boundaries of family
privacy to give a parent this particular option.
The second and more plausible explanation for the persistence of
pediatric sibling transplants, and specifically of the view that parents
See supra notes 184–216 and accompanying text.
Other extraordinary decisions that would fit within this analysis include that of a parent
to deprive one of her children of necessaries (food, shelter, medical care) as a way to ensure the
success of her other child, and to force one of her children to work to support her other child’s
educational opportunities.
218
219
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ought to be able to make this choice, is based in a set of informal social
norms and aspirations about family and relationships within the family
that are only incompletely captured by fiduciary theory and related
doctrine. Thus, some scholars have implied that expanding the
boundaries of family privacy to allow parents to remove a healthy child’s
organ to benefit an ill sibling can be justified (and acceptability of the
practice explained) if fiduciary theory and its individually-focused best
interests test are scrapped in favor of a “unit” theory of the family or an
“interdependence” and “obligations” theory of intra-family
relationships.
For example, George Annas, Leonard Glantz, and Barbara Katz
have suggested that “[t]he transplant cases revolve around the power of
the family to protect its own members. When a child is sick the family as
a unit is permitted to use its resources and make sacrifices to help the
sick member.” 220 And Michael Morley has argued that
[f]amilies, especially immediate families, are fundamental units in
our society, and to treat each member as a self-interest-maximizer is
to misconstrue the nature of familial relations. Many important
decisions are normally made based on the best interests of the
family . . . . Family members regularly are called upon to sacrifice for
each other, and parents are most often the ones responsible for
managing the allocation of burdens and responsibilities. . . .
In ruling that a court may not compel an unwilling, competent
individual to become an organ donor, a Pennsylvania court
accurately noted, “Our society, contrary to many others, has as its
first principle, the respect for the individual, and that society and
government exist to protect the individual from being invaded and
hurt by another.” However accurate this depiction of the relationship
among individuals in society at large may be, it would be a gross
distortion to characterize familial relationships in a similar manner.
Family members—parents, children, adolescents, and adult
incompetents living under their care—owe responsibilities toward
each other that do not exist among members of society at large.
The Pennsylvania court went on to declare, “For a society which
respects the rights of one individual, to sink its teeth into the jugular
vein or neck of one of its members and suck from it sustenance for
220 GEORGE J. ANNAS ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT TO HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION: THE
SUBJECT’S DILEMMA 87 (1977). These authors suggest that “the power of the family to protect its
own members” is the real motivation behind the sibling transplant cases: “The courts that
permit transplants have gone through incredible feats of mental gymnastics, such as finding
benefit where none exists, to overcome [this] general rule.” Id. And they argue that “[t]he
Farinelli case, tired of these maneuvers, directly confronted the issue and held that the family
could protect its members, and made the decision on that basis.” Id. See supra notes 95–111 and
accompanying text (discussing Farinelli); see also Loken, supra note 24, at 1158 (developing the
idea of “obligations” among family members, particularly parental obligations).
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another member, is revolting to our hard-wrought concepts of
jurisprudence.” Notwithstanding the harsh and unappealing rhetoric
with which this sentiment is expressed, such interdependence is an
essential feature of families. 221

No one has developed this idea further, at least not in this context. 222 A
fuller account, one which could explain why people believe that
removing an organ from a healthy child to benefit an ill sibling is an
appropriate exercise of parental (and sometimes also judicial) authority,
might go something like this:
The family as a unit or entity is generally held to be essential to the
society institutionally, and to individuals relationally. To the extent that
it needs explanation and grounding, this view finds ample support in
political philosophy, natural law, evolutionary biology, and
psychology. 223 Many things contribute to the family’s essential nature in
221 Morley, supra note 207, at 1243–44 (footnotes omitted) (quoting McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa.
D. & C.3d 90, 91 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1978)).
222 A few scholars have developed related theories of the family without regard to sibling
transplants. See, e.g., Dailey, supra note 13, at 967 & n.29 (describing historical construction of
the family as a unit which “operate[s] according to the private virtues of love, altruism and
dependence,” and citing a related view that “‘[t]he morality of altruism has been supposed to
animate the family to the same extent that the morality of individualism has been supposed to
pervade the marketplace’” (citation omitted)); Fineman, supra note 10, at 1220–21 (arguing that
“confer[ring] autonomy on caretaking or dependency units” rather than on individuals within
such units, is most likely to ensure “collective responsibility for dependency”); Loken, supra
note 24, at 1200 (suggesting that intra-family obligations arise out of gratitude for prior gifts
given); Martha Minow, All in the Family & in All Families: Membership, Loving, and Owing, 95
W. VA. L. REV. 275 (1993) (interdependence and obligation; intra-family obligations arise out of
the relationship; note that she asks but does not attempt to answer the question how sibling
transplants would fare according to this theory of the family); Teitelbaum, supra note 15, at
540–42, 544 (describing “conventional understandings of the family” including as a “‘unit’” or
“‘entity’” which “reflects both the internal governance of the family and its relation to other
governmental units”; criticizing this understanding as “[un]convincing under modern
conditions”); id. at 552 (noting that family members “are . . . expected to give gifts and provide
services to each other that they are not expected to give or provide to others and are, in some
sense, encouraged to do so”).
223 See, e.g., Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277, 285 (N.Y. 1976) (“The nature of human
relationships suggests overall the natural workings of the child-rearing process as the most
desirable alternative.”); Loken, supra note 24, at 1162 (quoting John Locke, “Adam and Eve,
and after them all Parents were, by the Law of Nature, under an obligation to preserve, nourish,
and educate the Children, they had begotten, not as their own Workmanship, but the
Workmanship of their own Maker, the Almighty, to whom they were to be accountable for
them.”); id. at 1137 (“[O]n a subconscious, biological level we may be programmed to
maximize our ‘reproductive success,’ by parenting in such a way as to produce the maximum
number of healthy descendants.”); id. at 1143 (“The difficulty of fulfilling parental duties for
more than one child goes far beyond the initial question of procreation. Some children need
more from a parent to survive or thrive, but other children may seem to a parent worth more in
terms of their likely overall contribution to the general welfare, however defined. Consider the
wrenching choices faced by parents who have a badly disabled or catastrophically ill child, as
well as one or more healthy ones.”); id. at 1189 (quoting Plato, “This is how every mortal
creature perpetuates itself. It cannot, like the divine, be still the same throughout eternity; it can
only leave behind new life to fill the vacancy that is left in its species by obsolescence. This . . . is
how the body and all else that is temporal partakes of the eternal; there is no other way. And so
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these respects, but most central is its ability and willingness to nurture
or at least to sustain its members. Whether this function is examined
from the perspective that the family is an organic unit whose members
exist at least in part for the benefit of the whole, or from the perspective
that the family is a collection of interdependent individuals who have
mutual obligations of care and support, it contemplates individuals who
“do their share” as they are able toward the best interests of the
collective and of needy individuals within it. 224 It also contemplates
individuals who (at least to a point) sacrifice their selfish interests to
help secure the lives especially, but also the general welfare, of their
relatives. 225
These sacrifices may be physical because, within the family, bodily
integrity is not privileged to the same extent as the preservation of life,
relationships, or even parental prerogatives. 226 (Of course, this is not the
case vis à vis the outside world.) 227 In fact, sacrifices and losses of
physical integrity within the family might be considered both
commonplace and expected. Depending upon one’s point of view, they
include women bearing children and suffering the pains and risks of
childbirth and even breast-feeding, men and women working in
physically detrimental and high-risk jobs to support the family or to
spare its other members from exposure to detriment and risk, 228 and
children suffering the pains of corporal punishment and foregoing
educational and other opportunities to contribute their physical labor to
a family enterprise.
Moreover, the sacrifices may be made by or required of any family
member who has something to give, including young children, because
neither autonomy nor choice are relevant in the circumstances. This is
it is no wonder that every creature prizes its own issue, since the whole creation is inspired by
this love, this passion for immortality.” (alteration in original)).
224 Minow, supra note 222, at 320 n.166.
225 Examples of such intra-family sacrifices abound, including men who repeatedly reenlisted for duty during the Vietnam War to ensure that their brothers would not be called
up—based in the law that prohibited the government from conscripting more than one sibling
at a time; and adult children who make personal sacrifices to take care of elderly parents.
226 This norm should not insulate parents who (ab)use their children in ways—e.g., sexual or
physical—that bear no relation to the best interests of the family or to the legitimate needs of
individuals within the family. On the other hand, it should insulate parents who (ab)use their
children to gain an important benefit for the child herself (e.g., one view of corporal
punishment, of religious exemptions to medical neglect laws, and of other non-therapeutic
surgeries, e.g., gender re-assignment).
227 See supra notes 184–203 and accompanying text (discussing the notion of bodily integrity
and its sacrosanct place in American jurisprudence, including as this jurisprudence has
influenced the development of child maltreatment law); see also Coleman, supra note 12, at 623
(rejecting the view prevalent among some pediatric bioethicists that healthy children owe a
duty to society at large to participate as research subjects in more than minimal risk research
that may yield benefits to their population sub-group).
228 Other examples of sacrifices and consequent losses of physical integrity include working
in physically debilitating and high-risk jobs to spare others from having to do such work.
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because intra-family relations exist outside of the liberal, individualistic
paradigm within which these principles operate. 229 This analysis is not
altered by the fact that modern medicine has made it possible even for
infants to “do their share”—by “giving” cord blood or bone marrow, for
example—where previously these youngest of children could only be
characterized as dependent. By definition, age (as a proxy for individual
decisionmaking capacity) is irrelevant in the equation. Family members
are interdependent and expected to sacrifice for one another according
to their abilities and the needs of the others. 230 External variables,
including the state of medical knowledge, have always affected their
options—that is, what they are in fact able to do for one another, and
thus the nature of their interdependence. 231
Finally, the ability and willingness of the family to nurture and
sustain its members contemplates that parents will manage the system
that makes the necessary allocations, because among the parties who
could make the decisions—the child, the parents, and the state—parents
are best suited to assume this role. 232 The pre-competent child cannot be
asked to do so because she lacks the experience and judgment necessary
to assure sound decisionmaking not only for herself, but also in the
interests of those around her. And the state lacks both the capacity and
political status to micro-manage intra-family relations. Parents, on the
other hand, have both the capacity (by virtue of their maturity and
knowledge, including in particular about their children) and the
political status (based in accepted ideas of parents as property owners or
fiduciaries) to do this work. 233
As applied to the pediatric transplant setting, these informal norms
and aspirations about family suggest that all healthy individuals
including young children ought to be available and, whenever capacity
229 Fineman, supra note 10, at 1222 (her “argument in favor of autonomy for the caretaking
unit is that some relationships should be considered outside of the equality paradigm”); Morley,
supra note 207, at 1243–44 (arguing that while liberal principles properly govern the
relationship between individuals and the state, they are irrelevant to intra-family governance
and in particular to the propriety of intra-family organ sharing).
230 It is impossible to avoid the reflection that this description of the family and of intrafamily relationships sounds a lot like the communist principle “[f]rom each according to his
ability, to each according to his needs.” KARL MARX, CRITIQUE OF THE GOTHA PROGRAMME 27
(1875). That communism has been rejected in the United States as a political philosophy which
would govern the individual’s relationship to the state says little about how Americans imagine
the political philosophy which governs the family as a unit.
231 Other variables that have the same effect on the range of family members’ ability to help
one another survive and succeed include physical capacity and geography.
232 See supra notes 23–27 and accompanying text. The “parent” in this scenario may actually
be a child, for example, where the mother and father are old and the child is the adult who
manages their care, or where the mother and father are absent or lack relevant capacity, and the
child, albeit a minor, is the next best option.
233 This analysis is entirely consistent with the way the law describes or structures the
relationship between the state, parents, and children. See id.
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allows it, also willing to give an organ to benefit an ill or dying family
member. Doing so even where the transplant procedure involves
significant injury, pain, recovery time, and long-term consequences for
the donor can be considered merely one among many forms of
appropriate self-sacrifice in the interests of the family and/or of a needy
member of the group. Moreover, decisional authority in this context is
properly rested on parents as the natural leaders of the family. As the
Alabama probate court concluded in In re S.C., whatever the law might
say otherwise
the natural parents . . . of the[ ] minor children have the right to give
their consent to the medical procedures and treatments [associated
with the transplant] . . . in order to preserve [their injured child’s]
life, prevent permanent physical impairment or deformity, and to
alleviate prolonged agonizing pain. 234

To this point, I have assumed that a unit theory of the family and
an interdependence and obligations theory of intra-family relationships
are indistinguishable. Distinctions do exist, however, and they are not
inconsequential:
Most important, a unit theory of the family will countenance more
sacrifice than will an interdependence and obligations theory of intrafamily relationships. As applied to sibling transplants, for example, one
might argue that in a family with several small children, the health and
wellbeing of the mother and/or father is more critical than the health
and wellbeing, and maybe even the survival, of one of the smaller
children. This, in turn, would suggest the propriety of taking from one
of those smaller children what was necessary to assure her parent’s
welfare. Presumably, this outcome would be impermissible in a family
that is guided by principles of interdependence and obligation because,
by definition, these principles dictate respect for and mutuality among
the individuals who comprise the collective; that is, regardless of the
practical implications, the small child would not be considered less
valuable than her parent. 235
To the extent that a unit theory imagines an organic family whose
members are in a biological, psychological, and philosophical sense all
part of a single whole, it also suggests that removing an organ—skin, for
example—from one member to give to another is analogous to an
autograft (transferring skin from one to another place on a single
person’s body). In other words, unit theories of the family blur if not
erase entirely the line between the individual and the group, and thus
Order on Petition, supra note 7, at 510.
Woodhouse, supra note 11, at 1260 (“I believe we could arrive at the same place by
focusing on individual rights of adults and children as ‘persons’ that gain added force by being
a part of mutual relationships that are reciprocal in nature.”).
234
235
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make it easier to rationalize the transfer. For example, because identical
twins are part of a single whole, if an injured twin needs a large swath of
her healthy sister’s skin either to live or simply to avoid significant
scarring in psychologically or physically sensitive areas, the healthy twin
needs to submit to the harvesting even if doing so results in otherwise
unnecessary scarring of her own. This analysis is inconsistent with an
interdependence and obligations theory of intra-family relationships
because this theory recognizes not only the importance of family but
also the separate integrity of its individual members and a
corresponding limit to their intra-family obligations that is itself based
in mutual respect for their individuality. Thus, notwithstanding their
genetic status as identical twins, the twins are not one, they are sisters,
and the healthy twin may not owe the injured twin a swath of skin if this
is merely to assure to the extent possible that they continue to match.
While I suspect that in this time and place a unit theory of the
family is likely to be less attractive than an interdependence and
obligations theory of intra-family relationships, in general both have
quite a lot of appeal because they reinforce the promise that is family.
This is perhaps especially important in this increasingly individualistic
culture, where the dominant social norms and aspirations tend to
emphasize each person’s separateness and thus, inevitably, each person’s
aloneness. Children in particular (along with older and disabled adults)
might welcome the existence of a set of strong, at least informal, norms
that not only recognize their inevitable dependency but that also
privilege caretaking decisions and behaviors that are designed in some
cases literally to keep them alive, and in others simply to foster
mutuality and interdependence among family members. 236
But there are also two important caveats as these approaches would
be applied to the pediatric sibling transplant setting:
First, despite the rhetoric about family unity, interdependence, and
obligation, 237 and the general sense from the cases that parents, doctors,
and judges are primarily motivated by the desire to save the life of a
child no matter how this is to be done, in fact it is only acceptable
according to these informal norms and aspirations to require adult
incompetents and little children to “donate” an organ. Older but still
minor children may be asked or pressured to assent, but if they refuse, at
least one of the three parties involved in the procedure (the parents, the
doctors, or the court) will most likely decline to proceed. And no
competent adult, no matter whether she is a parent or sibling, can be
236 MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY
(2005).
237 See, e.g., Morley, supra note 207, at 1244 (“Family members—parents, children,
adolescents, and adult incompetents living under their care—owe responsibilities toward each
other that do not exist among members of society at large.”).
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forced even to submit to compatibility testing in this context—where
family members seek to pressure a reluctant prospective donor, the
medical community has developed ways to protect her, and the law
categorically prohibits compulsion. This distinction between
“incompetent” and “competent” family members mostly reflects the
extraordinary strength of the society’s commitment to individual adults’
decisional autonomy, particularly as autonomy relates to physical
integrity; 238 the commitment to alternative norms and aspirations about
the family is weak in comparison. Most importantly for present
purposes, however, the difference between the way little children and
adults are treated reflects the unique property-like power that parents
and others are often believed appropriately to have over the children,
including with respect to physical invasions.
The second caveat concerning the application of informal norms
and aspirations about family to the pediatric sibling transplant context is
that it is not always easy to define “family.” The cases suggest that these
norms and aspirations only apply within the original intact nuclear
family so that “donations” can only be forced within that group. Indeed,
even within this family, in circumstances where the harvesting surgery is
particularly intrusive and impacting, particularly close biological and
emotional ties—for example, those between identical twins—are
favored. 239 In contrast, absent fathers who wish to use their healthy
children’s organs to benefit relatively unfamiliar half-siblings can be
rebuffed, 240 which suggests how slim the prospects are for others more
distantly removed. This restriction assures that the number of children
who are either used as or permitted to be organ sources is relatively low
in comparison to what it would be otherwise; depending upon one’s
view of and goals with respect to pediatric sibling transplants, this may
be a good thing. On the other hand, as Martha Albertson Fineman has
acknowledged in a more general context, the “entity version[] . . . [of]
family privacy” suffers from “the historic doctrinal limitation that it
applies primarily to family units that conform to ideological
conventions about appropriate form and function—intact nuclear
families.” 241 In other words, it is inconsistent with progressive and
increasingly accepted social norms about family form and also with the
more complicated lives people increasingly live. And yet if one were to
imagine expanding the notion of family to accommodate this variety of
functional family forms as some commentators suggest,242
See supra notes 184–86 and accompanying text (describing this commitment).
See, e.g., Masden v. Harrison, No. 68651 (Mass. Eq. June 12, 1957) (decision on file with
author); Order on Petition, supra note 7.
240 See, e.g., Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990).
241 Fineman, supra note 10, at 1216.
242 See, e.g., id. at 1221 (proposing that autonomy and privacy should be “confer[red] . . . on
caretaking or dependency units. . . . defined through [their] function[], not [their] form”).
238
239
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circumscribing the universe of potential pediatric “donors” would
become that much more complicated, especially as biological
compatibility becomes decreasingly significant. 243
C.

The Dilemma Posed by the Status Quo

The strength of informal norms and aspirations about the family as
a unit or group of interdependent, mutually-obligated individuals goes
far toward explaining the persistence of pediatric sibling transplants.
(The remainder of the explanation is likely factual: Medicine makes it
possible to engage in organ transfers and many adults continue to
believe they have property-like power over little children.) The law’s
concept of the child as an individual worthy of fiduciary protection,
particularly with respect to her bodily integrity, explains the necessary
sub rosa nature of the practice. These explanations are instructive,
particularly because pediatric sibling transplants take place at the
intersection of law and medicine where philosophical and ethical
collisions are both a commonplace and commonly misunderstood. 244
The status quo that exists because of the particular collision at issue
here—law that is different on the books than it is on the ground and
decisionmaking in the latter context that is necessarily hidden from
public view—is both practically and normatively problematic:
It is practically problematic because in most cases it leaves affected
parties without a coherent answer to the question whether it is legally
permissible to perform a pediatric sibling transplant. Most important, it
leaves healthy children who would be used as organ sources without the
protections one would expect from law developed and applied in the
open. Although thoughtful, respected pediatric ethicists have established
good protocols delineating the conditions under which a child may be
used as an organ source, these protocols are neither binding nor subject
to external review; a particular hospital or transplant team has the
choice to abide by them or not. 245
The status quo is normatively problematic because of the blurry if
not invisible line that is thus drawn—in this case between permissible
and impermissible surgeries and ultimately between conduct that is
within and beyond the boundaries of family privacy. In these
circumstances law loses its expressive function except to the extent that
243 See, e.g., ABO Incompatibility in Transplants, CEDARS-SINAI, http://www.cedarssinai.edu/Patients/Programs-and-Services/Comprehensive-Transplant-Center/Kidney-andPancreas/Conditions-and-Treatments/ABO-Incompatibility-in-Transplants.aspx (last visited
Mar. 14, 2014) (noting that “innovative new procedures allow the transplant team to break the
ABO incompatibility barrier”).
244 See Coleman & Rosoff, supra note 122 (discussing these collisions).
245 See infra notes 286–88 and accompanying text (evaluating these protocols).
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it announces the absence of rules beyond the good faith or ethical
grounding of the adults in the equation. The immunity and flexibility
that results are certainly valued by the adults and institutions (including
hospital risk managers and general counsels) who are involved in
pediatric sibling transplants, but it is difficult to make the case that the
most vulnerable parties in the mix are properly served.
III. SETTING THE BOUNDARIES OF FAMILY PRIVACY
Parents use of minor children as organ sources for their ill and
injured siblings tests the boundaries of family privacy in unique ways.
Unlike other things parents do that cause their children harm, pediatric
sibling transplants are at once prohibited by the law and the fiduciary
norms and aspirations that dictate its terms and permitted by powerful
competing informal norms and aspirations about family and also
perhaps about children as property. This state of affairs suggests that
society is conflicted not only about the location of the boundaries of
family privacy, but also in the first instance about the tools that it is
prepared to use to set them. As I note at the end of Part II, the effects of
this situation are both practical and normative, and most are negative:
The legal status of pediatric sibling transplants is hazy at best; healthy
children who would be used as organ sources are left without the
protections one would expect from rules that are developed and
administered in the open; and ultimately the law expresses only
dysfunction.
In this last part of the Article I agree with scholars who have
preceded me that the boundaries of family privacy ought to be drawn
using fiduciary theory. I join the sometimes-controversial claim that
fiduciary theory requires the law and legal doctrine to respect not only
the child’s physical integrity but also her emotional and developmental
welfare, including her evolving personhood. And I argue that as applied
to pediatric sibling transplants, this requires the law expressly to
recognize the fact of pediatric sibling transplants in all of their possible
forms and to adopt rules that will consistently and adequately protect
the interests of the child who would be used as an organ source.
A.

Defining the Boundaries According to Fiduciary Theory

Scholars in this modern period generally agree that those who take
care of children, including their parents and their parents’ delegates, are
or should be guided in their decisionmaking by fiduciary principles.
They do not all use this term, and they disagree about how exactly to
characterize the parent-child relationship and in particular about
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whether the child ought to be recognized as having “rights” as against
her parents in cases of intra-family conflict. 246 Notwithstanding their
differences, however, they agree that
the child is no longer as she was throughout much of Western
history—the equivalent of property or else a mere extension of her
parents who could do with her as they wished. . . . Rather, the child
today is an individual, albeit a preautonomous one, to whom her
parents and society owe basic obligations of nurture and respect. An
important aspect of this modern vision is that the child’s body and
mind are ultimately her own, not to be used to her detriment by the
adults who are responsible for her care and development. To the
contrary, her parents’ right to exercise discretion in the ways they
guide her along the path to adulthood is directly tied to the
fulfillment of their fiduciary obligations of nurture and respect,
including to the development of a relationship with her that honors
these commitments. 247

With some notable exceptions, this theoretical approach appears to be
shared by pediatric bioethicists and others in the medical and scientific
communities who view the child as the patient and the requirement of
proxy (parental) consent as protective of her individual best interests. 248
This concept of the child and account of the parent-child
relationship have their origins in two related revolutions: The political
individuation of the child beginning in the late 1800s and the
development of a science-based model of child development beginning
in the mid-to-late 1900s. 249 The former made it inevitable that children
would come to be seen as individuals, still inextricably tied to but also
clearly distinct from their parents and the society, and that, at the very
least, questions would be asked about the nature of their separate status
within the democracy. The latter has assured both that this status
continues to be different from that of adults and that children are
entitled to care that corresponds with their developmental needs and
interests.
The boundaries of family privacy that are established according to
fiduciary theory are different from those that obtained in previous
246 See Coleman, supra note 12, at 615 (citing Scott & Scott, supra note 16, at 2402–03;
Woodhouse, supra note 18, at 313–18); id. at 616 n.387 (citing Bartlett, supra note 24, at 297–
98).
247 Id. at 615–16 (footnotes omitted); see also Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277, 281 (N.Y.
1976) (“[T]he modern principle [is] that a child is a person, and not a subperson over whom
the parent has an absolute possessory interest. A child has rights too, some of which are of a
constitutional magnitude.” (citations omitted)).
248 See, e.g., COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, supra note 29, at 1–2; Ramsey, supra
note 24; Lainie Friedman Ross, Health Care Decisionmaking by Children: Is It in Their Best
Interest?, 27 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 41 (1997). But see Loretta M. Kopelman, Children and
Bioethics: Uses and Abuses of the Best-Interests Standard, 22 J. MED. & PHIL. 213 (1997).
249 See generally Buss, supra note 22, passim.
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periods where entity theories of the family and concepts of the child as
property were predominant. Parents and their delegates are no longer
believed to be entitled to cause harm to children that is not in the
children’s own (as opposed to the family’s or the parents’) best
interests. 250 This condition inevitably restricts the kinds and degrees of
permissible harm that may be caused, and also the nature of the
exceptions that can be developed. 251
These restrictions, and the embedded concept of the child as a preautonomous person deserving of society’s respect and protection,
themselves are rightly privileged—the boundaries of family privacy
ought to be located according to the coordinates they dictate. It is
undoubtedly in the interests of children (and other vulnerable members
of a society) that the society establish policies and laws that are
consistent with a sense of their vulnerability and a commitment to their
protection. Such policies and laws are also in the interests of society
itself: Practically, respect for and protection of children and other
individuals within vulnerable sub-populations maximizes the likelihood
that they will flourish as persons and thus that they can become
successful, contributing members of the society. Ethically, such respect
and protection are indicators of a mature, confident society that does
not abide the easy erasure of the interests of weaker individuals by those
who are in positions of power.
The boundaries of family privacy that are established according to
these norms and aspirations should not be ignored simply because
adults sometimes have competing interests; indeed, the doctrines that
operationalize these boundaries draw a firm line beyond which they
cannot go, regardless of their motivations, precisely because their
conflicting interests have historically caused children significant harm.
Thus, parents who needed or wanted free labor or money could use or
lease out their children with impunity when the child was viewed as
property or even as one with his parents and family. 252 According to
these same norms and aspirations, it was no stretch for parents and their
delegates also to (ab)use and neglect the children’s bodies and minds,
for theirs was the right and the power. 253 It is important in this respect
that, like the interest in saving or ameliorating the life of an ill or injured
child, adults’ competing interests in these prior periods—running a
family farm or business, funding its operations, and sustaining
entrenched hierarchies—were often not only normative but laudable;
adults often (ab)used children for good reasons.
250 See supra notes 18–28 and accompanying text (describing the connection between
fiduciary theory and the best interest presumption and test).
251 See supra notes 186–97 and accompanying text (setting out the rules that result).
252 See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text (describing this effect).
253 Id.
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There are differences, of course, between a property theory of the
child and an entity or interdependence and obligations theory of the
family and intra-family relations: Presumably the former would justify
outright destruction whereas the latter would not. But to the extent that
both allow for a range of treatment, from the child as treasure to the
child as organ source—and the latter either according to Jodi Picoult’s
My Sister’s Keeper 254 or Kazuo Ishiguro’s Never Let Me Go 255—even
entity and interdependence and obligations theories of the family and
intra-family relationships risk too much. As others have noted before
me,
to speak of the family as having its own goals and purposes and to
speak of the familial perspective and familial objectives is to engage
in dangerous reification. . . . Given the very great inequality of power
between parents and children, reference to the family’s interest or
“familial objectives” is all too likely to serve as a cover for the parents’
interests precisely in those cases in which the latter conflict with
those of the child. 256

In any event, as I will argue in the next section, it is better to consider
the more appealing aspects of entity and interdependence and
obligations theories of the family, and of intra-family relationships
within a fiduciary framework—for example, in the context of a best
interests analysis—by taking into account the child’s developing
personhood and the role of her family members in that development. In
this respect I agree with Barbara Bennett Woodhouse that

254 JODI PICOULT, MY SISTER’S KEEPER (2005) (portraying a child who was conceived to be a
stem cell donor for her sister, who was periodically used as an organ source after the original
“donation,” and who was loved by her parents and treated as a full member of the family).
255 KAZUO ISHIGURO, NEVER LET ME GO (2005) (portraying children cloned from their
relatives and raised apart from them so that they could eventually harvest their organs without
the need to address emotional and relational ties).
256 BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 206, at 236–37. As Lee Teitelbaum has noted, the idea
of

the family unit in its “entity” or anthropomorphic form leaves little space for
recognizing individual claims—the interests that arise from a wide range of
individualized decisions and arrangements—within a family. Respect for the
“privacy” of the family unit seemingly requires ignoring other, possibly competing,
bearers of rights—the individual family members.
Teitelbaum, supra note 15, at 554; see also Dailey, supra note 13, at 981 (“Individual autonomy
and communal family life are compatible only so long as family life remains harmonious.
When family consensus breaks down, and family members either voluntarily seek or are legally
required to seek public resolution of their differences, constitutional protection for the family
unit becomes problematic.”); Scott & Scott, supra note 16, at 2473 (“Conflicting signals are sent
by a legal regime that emphasizes parental rights as well as the welfare of the child, but links the
two by balancing the one against the other. It is not surprising that this is understood to mean
that when parental rights are vindicated, children’s welfare is sacrificed.”).
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[i]n rejecting the ‘entity’ or ‘unit’ as a governing paradigm [we] do
not mean to deny the importance of relationships to family theory or
to claim that ‘the family’ is no more than a casual grouping of
isolated individuals. But there are better ways to express the truth of
family connectedness, ways that do not subsume the child’s identity
and agency. 257

The argument in favor of fiduciary theory as the basis to draw lines
beyond which parents and their delegates cannot go also has a
pragmatic basis. It is unrealistic to think that law and policy in this
period can be made to recognize the primacy of approaches that reimagine the child as property or even as subsumed within a family that
disregards her status as an individual worthy of respect in her own right.
Constitutional doctrine, federal and state statutory law, and the states’
common law are all uniform in their commitment to the born child as
an individual whose interests are carefully delineated and whose proxies
are limited accordingly. 258 Although state law is malleable to some
extent, it is ultimately subject to the supremacy of federal law; 259 and
although the latter affords parents significant liberty, the rebuttable
presumption is that they will exercise that liberty according to first
principles: in the best interests of the child. 260
B.

Adopting a Holistic Approach to Fiduciary Theory

Although fiduciary theory is established as the basis to draw the
boundaries of family privacy, its particulars are subject to discussion.
That is, scholars and policymakers can and do usefully debate what it
means to act responsibly toward the child, including the aspects of the
child’s welfare that are subject to respect and protection. For purposes of
this Article, the most salient features of that debate concern the extent to
which the child’s physical integrity is privileged and the ambivalence
that characterizes the treatment of her emotional and developmental
integrity.
Consistent with the way law and policy treat adults, children’s law
and policy focus on the child’s physical welfare. Tort and maltreatment
law protect the child from personally unnecessary batteries, including
those that would be inflicted by her parents and their delegates. The
privileges or exceptions that define the batteries that count as necessary
are scarce: Only medical treatment and reasonable corporal
punishment, both of which are focused on the best interests of the child
257
258
259
260

Woodhouse, supra note 11, at 1259.
See Coleman, supra note 12, at 545–52.
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
See supra notes 187–97 and accompanying text (describing this doctrine).
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herself, are formally recognized. 261 There is often conflict about the
nature and degree of physical harm that should justify the state’s
intrusion on family privacy to protect the child according to these
rules, 262 but the fundamental commitment to the child’s physical welfare
is beyond dispute.
In contrast, law and policy are at least ambivalent about the child’s
emotional and developmental welfare. There are certainly times when
important competing interests are demoted, particularly in favor of
children’s educational development. (Here it is appropriate to cite to
Brown v. Board of Education, which privileged African-American
children’s right to an integrated education and to the associated
psychological and developmental benefits above the white citizenry’s
interest in separation of the races in public institutions.)263 But mostly,
children’s law and policy mirror the law’s general disdain for things
emotional. Thus, although tort law no longer immunizes parents and
their delegates from liability for intentional torts, one would be hard
pressed to develop a viable claim for “emotional battery” or “intentional
infliction of emotional distress.” 264 Maltreatment law lists “emotional
abuse” and sometimes also “emotional neglect” as legally recognized
harms that provide the basis for state intervention into the family to
protect the child, but these are both severely defined and rarely used on
their own; to the extent they are the basis for state action, it is generally
as appended to a charge of physical harm. 265 Finally, although
constitutional doctrine does suggest (mostly implicitly) that aspects of
the child’s developing personhood are subject to protection, 266 unlike

261 See supra notes 194–95 and accompanying text (describing this doctrine and its
commitments).
262 See, e.g., Coleman et al., supra note 119, at 113–19 (setting out the states’ different
approaches).
263 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that
although the state could require children’s attendance in some schools, it could not bar parents
from choosing an otherwise legitimate private institution); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923) (holding that the state could not bar parents from providing their children with an
education in part in German, but it could require parents to send their children to some
school).
264 See generally G. Steven Neeley, The Psychological and Emotional Abuse of Children: Suing
Parents in Tort for the Infliction of Emotional Distress, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 689, passim (2000).
265 See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(c) (West 2014).
266 See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (recognizing the right of a mature minor to
consent, with judicial oversight, to an abortion and the significance of the decision whether to
bear and raise a child to the minor’s construction of her future); Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584
(1979) (recognizing a child’s interest in being free from involuntary institutionalization and the
significance of such institutionalization for the child’s construction of his reputation and
dignity); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (recognizing children’s right
to religious expression and the significance of religion to their families’ construction of their
identities).
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physical harm 267 and apart from the education 268 and adolescent
reproductive autonomy 269 cases, this interest has not been the basis for
intervention in the family to protect the child from parentally-inflicted
harm.
It is understood that emotional injuries can cut as deeply and be as
impacting as physical ones; yet there are good reasons for the
government’s restraint with respect to their recognition. This is perhaps
particularly true in the intra-family setting where the infliction of such
injuries is ubiquitous and likely unavoidable, but where children are still
best raised. In the case of parentally-inflicted psychological and
developmental harm, the concerns include the conceptual problem of
drawing a line between permissible and impermissible harm; the
practical problem of how to evaluate and measure harm to determine if
it meets the threshold requirements for intervention; and the fact that
intervention in even dysfunctional families itself risks significant
harm. 270 It is this last point especially that disturbs those who are most
protective of family privacy and that makes the claim for recognition of
an interest in emotional and developmental welfare controversial:
Unlike physical injuries which either exist or not and which, when they
exist, are mostly ascertainable, emotional injuries are subject to
speculation and problems of proof and are thus more likely to provide
the basis for unwarranted interventions, even by officials acting in good
faith.
I do not intend to minimize the nature or extent of these concerns.
However, recognizing them does not require ignoring the fact that being
a good fiduciary to a child—acting and making decisions in her best
interests—is meaningless as a standard of care if it ignores her
psychological and developmental welfare. 271 As proof of principle,
simply imagine a boy whose parent takes fine care of his physical
wellbeing at the same time that she devastates him emotionally and
developmentally to the point where he suffers a range of disabling and
even destructive conditions; here I intend to describe commonly
understood environmental triggers for, among other things, severe

267 See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (parental rights can be terminated
where there is clear and convincing evidence of unfitness based on physical abuse and neglect).
268 See supra note 263 and accompanying text (noting some of the education cases).
269 See, e.g., Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 622 (providing a judicial bypass for adolescent girls seeking
to avoid parents who would be obstacles to abortions).
270 See Coleman, supra note 9, at 414–19, 518–21 (emphasizing the ironic costs of state
intervention in the family to protect the child including the emotional costs associated with
home visits and removals).
271 See, e.g., Emotional Abuse, AM. HUMANE ASS’N, http://www.americanhumane.org/
children/stop-child-abuse/fact-sheets/emotional-abuse.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2014);
Stephanie Partridge, Recognizing and Understanding Emotional Child Abuse, MORE4KIDS,
http://safety.more4kids.info/202/signs-of-emotional-child-abuse (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).
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depression and psychopathy. 272 It would be dishonest to claim that this
parent had acted as a good fiduciary in her son’s best interests, and a
theory of the parent-child relationship that allowed for this claim would
lack integrity. Fiduciary theory ought therefore always be described
holistically, accounting for all-important aspects of the child’s welfare.
To the extent that this description begs implementation problems—and
it does—I agree with others who have argued that these can and should
be addressed on a case-by-case basis. 273
There is a tremendous amount of literature within many
disciplines that elaborates on what it means for a parent to account for
the child’s psychological and developmental welfare. For purposes of
this Article, it suffices to note the longstanding concerns about the
short- and long-term psychological implications of being used as an
organ source and also of not being permitted to donate. Although these
implications have properly been described as speculative given how
specific-to-the-circumstances emotional harm can be and also given the
dearth of empirical data on point, 274 the Texas appellate court in the
Little case was correct that to the extent they can be ascertained, they are
both relevant and important to consider. 275
Finally, doing this work consistent with a holistic account of
fiduciary theory requires attention to the effects of emotional and
developmental benefits and injuries on the child’s evolving identity or
personhood. As Professor Emily Buss has described it, this evolution is
“the process by which an individual develops a sense of his own values,
interests, and abilities, and an understanding of how he relates to his
broader world.”276 It is generally understood that “[t]he [child’s]
personhood . . . develops [best] in a cocoon of enveloping
relationships—a tight-linked system of support, nurturance, and
guidance that socializes the child as a rational member of a collective
272 See, e.g., Willem H.J. Martens, The Hidden Suffering of the Psychopath, PSYCHIATRIC
TIMES, Aug. 25, 2006, available at http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/psychotic-affectivedisorders/hidden-suffering-psychopath-0 (summarizing characteristic features of a
psychopath’s childhood and tying these to the genetic bases for psychopathy); Emotional and
Psychological Trauma, HELPGUIDE.ORG, http://helpguide.org/mental/emotional_psychological_
trauma.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2014) (summarizing events and circumstances in childhood
that can lead to severe depression).
273 See, e.g., Sana Loue, Redefining the Emotional and Psychological Abuse and Maltreatment
of Children: Legal Implications, 26 J. LEGAL MED. 311, 320–23 (2005); Jessica Dixon Weaver,
The Principle of Subsidiarity Applied: Reforming the Legal Framework to Capture the
Psychological Abuse of Children, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 247, 268–69 (2011); J. Robert Shull,
Note, Emotional and Psychological Child Abuse: Notes on Discourse, History, and Change, 51
STAN. L. REV. 1665 (1999).
274 AAP Clinical Report, supra note 34, at 455–56.
275 See supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text (noting the court’s sentiments in this
regard).
276 Buss, supra note 22, at 14. This process is different from the developmental process,
which usually refers to cognitive, social, educational, and emotional maturation.
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group.” 277 Initially, of course the child’s “collective group” is his original
family, but over time it is also comprised of (or even replaced by)
outsiders to the original family: peers, teachers, and other adults. This
“matrix of sustaining and constitutive relationships[] . . . endow[] [him]
with an intellectual, moral, and cultural inheritance.” 278 Ultimately,
though, “this same self ‘is determined to make that inheritance his own
by fashioning an individual character and life plan, and by turning his
participation in social practices into performances expressive of his
individuality.’” 279 What this means is that good fiduciary choices must
take into account the child’s personhood in the moment of decision, but
also that it is a transitional moment in her identity formation and that
she will soon grow to be someone with additional or even different
constitutive and deeply meaningful relationships, experiences, and
values.
C.

Developing Law to Govern Pediatric Sibling Transplants

To assure that the parties are doing right by both children in a
potential pediatric sibling transplant situation, it is necessary for the law
to emerge from its longstanding sub rosa position, and for rules to be
developed based in these fiduciary principles. Until it does, as the legal
history shows, the risks are simply too high that inadequate attention
and respect will be paid to the multiple important interests of the
healthy minor children who would be used as organ sources. This is
because when rules are not transparent, they can be manipulated or
even ignored with impunity in circumstances where they appear to be
obstacles to the desired result. In the case of pediatric sibling
transplants, this situation is exacerbated by a misunderstanding about
what the rules actually permit and require; and it is not remedied by
otherwise thoughtful medical ethics guidelines because these are by
definition non-binding and also because they are inconsistent with
fiduciary theory in some aspects.

277 Brook K. Baker, Traditional Issues of Professional Responsibility and a Transformative
Ethic of Client Empowerment for Legal Discourse, 34 NEW ENG. L. REV. 809, 875 (2000); cf. AM.
LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03 (2002); id. § 2.02 cmt. e (“[T]he continuity of existing parent-child
attachments after the break-up of a family unit is a factor critical to the child’s well-being. Such
attachments are thought to affect the child’s sense of identity and later ability to trust and to
form healthy relationships.”).
278 Baker, supra note 277, at 875.
279 Id. at 875–76 (quoting STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE AND
COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 219 (1990)).
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The move to bring pediatric sibling transplants into the open and
expressly within the cognizance of existing law and its fiduciary
influences would likely have one of two “real world” effects:
The first could be to cause states to proscribe the practice in all
circumstances on the grounds that its necessary invasions fit squarely
within the definition of physical abuse and that an exception would be
unworkable because a healthy child’s interests cannot be adequately
protected (no matter how clear the protocol) where a dying or very ill or
injured child is the counterweight. As one judge is said to have opined,
“with [a child’s] life at risk, no court would hold against the parents’
wishes and the physician’s recommendation for the harvesting
procedures.”280 Bone marrow transplantation might be the exception if
the case is adequately made either generally or in individual cases that
both the physical invasions involved and the short- and long-term
psychological and physical risks are indeed negligible. 281
The second effect of a move to bring pediatric sibling transplants
within existing law could be to cause states to permit the practice as an
exception to the rule that intentional serious physical harm to a child is
prohibited abuse, but likely only in circumstances where the evidence
was compelling that the physical and psychological harms and risks
inherent in the harvesting would be outweighed by non-speculative
benefits to the donor child. Given that some pediatric sibling transplants
make sense from whatever theoretical or ethical perspective one holds,
this second, fine-tool approach would be preferable. To take the
simplest case again, fiduciary theory would certainly permit (and even
encourage) a bone marrow transplant where a physically and
emotionally healthy older adolescent in a loving and supportive
relationship with his parents and sibling clearly wants to make the
donation—the benefits of this process given his developmental stage,
including to the continued positive evolution of his personhood, could
be shown to outweigh the harms and risks inherent in the surgery.
The standard that would govern this new exception has two critical
components, both of which are designed to ensure that decisionmakers
in individual cases focus their attentions on the healthy child herself;
that they understand that their role is to protect her multifarious
interests; and that they only permit transplants that are consistent with
that fiduciary responsibility:
The first of these components is its evidentiary burden, which
requires that advocates of the transplant (usually parents and their ill or
See Tilden, supra note 1, at 97 (in the context of the In re S.C. discussion).
Although one might think that this has already been done given that the procedure
appears to be commonplace, in fact only two states have been convinced to adopt laws on point
and the American Academy of Pediatrics has only recently opined on its ethical status. See
supra notes 122, 174–76 and accompanying text.
280
281
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injured child’s doctors) produce child-specific evidence to support their
claims about harms, risks, and benefits, and which demands that this
evidence be clear and convincing before authority to conduct the
procedure is granted. This is to counter the tendency of courts and
hospitals to proceed on the basis of generalizations and suppositions,
most of which are never brought home to the healthy child herself and
which otherwise lack evidentiary support. Consistent with the
suggestion made by Baron, Botsford, and Cole in 1975, and apparently
accepted by most judges since then, the petitioners’ facts and the weight
of their evidence should be challenged by an adversary to the surgery;
this on the view that the adversarial process is an effective way to know
the truth about the procedure and the child’s circumstances. 282 “Donor
advocates” as envisioned by some in the medical community are
insufficient for this purpose because they are by design parties to a
collaborative process which focuses on both of the children’s interests
and which is deferential to parents’ wishes. 283 In such conditions and
given the context—usually fast-paced decisionmaking in the face of a
dying child—it is a real risk that unless an individual is designated
specifically for this purpose, no one in the process will have an interest
in identifying facts and making arguments that would counsel against
the transplant. As the Alabama decision in In re S.C. case suggests,
including a good GAL for the healthy child is insufficient standing alone
to guarantee that such evidence is treated appropriately, but the odds
that this evidence will be suppressed, minimized, or even ignored
inevitably increase if such a GAL is absent.
The second is its recognition that the child’s psychological and
developmental interests in this special context may be as significant as
her physical interests. As I explain in Part II, the law to date has not
generally seen fit to permit intentional physical injuries to a child where
the only arguable benefits are psychological. 284 This is in line with its
traditional privileging of physical harms and its separate concerns about
recognizing emotional harms. 285 I believe that this view is well-taken in
almost all other circumstances; however, it is lacking in the special case
of pediatric sibling transplants both as a practical matter because they
cannot proceed in the absence of evidence of psychological benefit since
there is no (or negative) physical benefit, and as a theoretical matter
because both allowing and disallowing a transplant can, depending on
the facts, have extraordinarily damaging implications for the healthy
282 See supra note 180 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the GAL in judicial
proceedings).
283 See id. (discussing the concept of and problems with the AAP’s construction of the
child’s donor advocate).
284 See supra notes 196–97 and accompanying text (explaining this point).
285 See supra notes 261–70 and accompanying text (discussing this background).
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child who would be used as an organ source. To ignore these
implications is, again, contrary to her best interests and inconsistent
with adults’ fiduciary obligations.
Given the significance of the child’s developing personhood in
particular, it is essential that the rule and process that is ultimately
developed to assess psychological harms and benefits assures careful
consideration of the child’s real ties to the members of her nuclear
family but also in particular to the sibling who needs an organ, of the
family’s relevant cultural norms and values, and of the ways and extent
to which she has, to that point, made them her own. This rule and
process must also assure careful consideration of the likelihood that the
significance of these ties, norms, and values will change as she grows,
and that others of equal or greater significance may develop. Because of
competing obligations, changed family circumstances and relationships,
a fear of surgery, or simply a particular sense of bodily integrity, it is not
unusual for adult family members to decline voluntarily to donate an
organ to an ill or injured sibling, even in otherwise loving, functional
families. Although it is expedient both to ignore or minimize this
possibility in a given case, and to conclude that a present-day analysis of
the future possibilities is too difficult in any event, honest fealty to
fiduciary principles demands that decisionmakers try their best to
understand the child in all of these respects.
Apart from the conditions that I have just described, developing
the rule and process to govern a “sibling transplant exception” to the law
prohibiting intentional physical harm to a child would not require
policymakers or judges to begin from scratch:
First, there is useful guidance to be drawn from the available
pediatric sibling transplant cases, both in terms of what they got right
and what they got wrong. Thus, most were correct—as in consistent
with law and its fiduciary influences—to set the standard as the best
interests of the healthy child; to use a balancing test to establish those
best interests, which focused only on that child; and to attempt to
ascertain the child’s emotional and developmental interests but also to
acknowledge the difficulties inherent in that enterprise. At the same
time, most were wrong—as in inconsistent with the law and its fiduciary
influences—not to require an important threshold of evidence to
support best interests arguments, since this is the only way to assure that
these are more than just arguments; not to focus initially on the physical
harm that is the surgical intrusion itself, since this is just as if not more
important from the law’s perspective than the short- and long-term
associated risks; and to assume that parental responsibility and
authority is or should be so broad as to permit even extraordinary
physical intrusions on a healthy child’s body so long as these are
undertaken in good faith.
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Second, as I have already noted, the medical community itself has
carefully considered pediatric sibling transplants from its own
professional and ethical perspectives and has developed protocols
consistent with these requirements. These protocols are based in many
shared principles and thus can provide additional guidance for the law.
Thus, both the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs (CEJA) of the
American Medical Association (AMA) and the Committee on Bioethics
of the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) have established the
following “stringent criteria” 286 for using healthy children as organ
sources: that other sources or options do not exist to address the ill
child’s circumstances; that both the healthy and the ill child will benefit
significantly from the transplant, and specifically that the healthy child
will benefit psychologically; that transplants only take place between
close family members; that the transplant poses a low medical risk for
the healthy child; and that the healthy child assent to the procedure. 287
These protocols are notable for their focus on assuring that the interests
of the healthy child are examined carefully and honestly, on their
insistence that every condition be met, and for their sense that this
requirement cannot be satisfied by unsupported assertions. Like the law
itself, these criteria are not without flaws. Most notably, neither requires
a transparent process involving a neutral decisionmaker, and the AAP’s
proposal in particular is (as subsequently interpreted) 288 overly
deferential toward parents’ wishes and decisions. But ultimately they
can help to fill in some of the details of what it would mean to do “best
interests” in this context.
CONCLUSION
A healthy minor child should be used as an organ donor only if there
is compelling factual evidence that the psychological benefits to that
child outweigh the necessary physical injuries. Such evidence will
often be difficult, even impossible, to muster. But it is only in these
circumstances that we can know that we are appropriate stewards of
her mental and physical health; that we are not sacrificing her for the

AAP Clinical Report, supra note 34, at 456–57.
See COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, supra note 29. It chose the “clear benefit”
standard in lieu of the best interests test because it believed the latter to be “vulnerable to
manipulation” and thus to permit “the decision maker’s own subjective values” too much
influence in the outcome of the process. Id.; AAP Clinical Report, supra note 34; AAP Policy
Statement, supra note 32.
288 See supra note 180 (discussing this deference).
286
287
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benefit of another simply because, in the excruciating moment of
decision, that seems like the right thing to do. 289

The law properly recognizes a right of family privacy, which
includes a right to make decisions about the family’s culture, how its
children will be raised, and how its relationships will be managed. It also
properly recognizes that parents are usually best placed to make those
decisions because they have the cognitive capacity, life experience, and
intimate knowledge necessary to do this well. However, these rights are
not and should not be limitless. In the modern context where the theory
of the parent-child relationship is a fiduciary one, and where the
concept of the child is that of a pre-autonomous person deserving of
respect and protection, the law must set the boundaries of family
privacy consistent with that theory and concept.
Pediatric sibling transplants test the modern boundaries of family
privacy in a way that perhaps no other parenting choice does: The
harvesting surgery causes important physical harm to the healthy child
who would be used as an organ source—harm the law normally
characterizes as a battery and as abuse—on the basis of other-thanfiduciary principles. That is, despite pro forma arguments about the
harvesting being in the best interests of the donor child, long-rejected
entity theories of the family and property theories of the family’s
children appear to underlie decisions by judges and others to proceed
with transplants.
It is probably because of this disconnect that the law’s role in
authorizing the surgeries remains sub rosa despite their prevalence.
That is, the use of a minor child as an organ source is not a privileged
battery, nor is it an exception to the law in every state that intentional
physical injury to a child is abuse unless it is justified as medical
treatment or reasonable corporal punishment. And there is a real dearth
of case law on point; indeed, the single published decision authorizing a
pediatric sibling transplant lacks precedential value. Nevertheless, there
is good evidence both that judges have and continue to authorize
transplants off the record, and that at least some hospitals are willing to
proceed in the absence of judicial authorization on the basis of rulings
by their internal ethics committees.
The law ought not abdicate its legitimate line-drawing authority in
this setting; and it ought not permit the boundaries of family privacy to
be reset according to notions about children as property or families as
organic entities. These notions are well-understood to pose enormous
risks for vulnerable family members including especially children, who
became eligible for protection from the state only when they were
289 DORIANE LAMBELET COLEMAN, GOOD QUESTION: AN EXPLORATION IN ETHICS (2011),
available at http://kenan.ethics.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/GQ-Coleman.pdf.
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reconceived as individuals whose dignity was valued accordingly.
Although there may be good reasons to consider using a healthy child as
an organ donor for her ill or injured sibling, these should not be
permitted to trump the child’s hard-won rights unless they are clearly
consistent with her fiduciary interests. Developing transparent,
enforceable standards to govern the decision whether to permit a
pediatric sibling transplant is precisely the law’s role.

